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INTRODUCTION
In 1998, Shamela Begum, the wife of a vegetable vendor and mother of
three children, left Bangladesh in search of greater economic opportunities
to provide a better life for herself and her family.1 A Bangladeshi
employment broker paired her with a housekeeping position in Bahrain, but
she soon was transferred to New York City to work as a live-in maid for a
Bahraini diplomat.2 To her horror, she was treated as a slave: her
employers, Mohammed Saleh and his wife, Khatun Saleh, confiscated her
passport, provided her with little food, and abused her verbally and
physically.3 Her employers confined Begum to their apartment and only
permitted her to leave on two occasions to accompany Mrs. Saleh to the
store.4 The Salehs also cheated Begum of her earned wages, paying her
only one hundred dollars a month for her fourteen-hour workdays,
notwithstanding a provision in her employment contract guaranteeing her
the minimum wage.5
1. See Somini Sengupta, An Immigrant’s Legal Enterprise In Suing Employer,
Maid Fights Diplomatic Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2000, at B1 (describing a
domestic worker in her mid-thirties who had never worked outside her home in
Bangladesh, but wanted to work abroad after observing friends find employment
abroad and earn enough money to build a new home).
2. See id. (explaining how Begum was brought to the United States on a special
visa designated for personal employees of United Nation (“UN”) officials). According
to U.S. Department of State (“State Department”) figures, there are approximately 800
domestic workers on special visas working for UN officials in the United States. Id.
See DOMESTIC WORKERS UNITED & DATA CENTER, HOME IS WHERE THE WORK IS:
INSIDE NEW YORK’S DOMESTIC WORK INDUSTRY 1 (2006) [hereinafter HOME IS WHERE
THE WORK IS] (defining domestic workers as live-in and live-out “nannies,
housekeepers, elderly companions, cleaners, babysitters, baby nurses and cooks”).
3. See Complaint at ¶¶ 23-41, Begum v. Saleh (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (No. 99-11834)
(alleging that the Salehs violated the Thirteenth Amendment by holding Begum in
involuntary servitude and disregarded federal and state minimum wage laws, among
other claims).
4. See id. (claiming that the Salehs committed false imprisonment); Sengupta,
supra note 1, at B1 (describing Begum’s isolation from the outside world where she
could not “feel the wind [or] see the trees,” and even her family was unaware of her
whereabouts for months); see also Hidden in the Home: Abuse of Domestic Workers
with Special Visas in the United States, 13 HUM. RTS. WATCH, No. 2, at 1,13 (2001)
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH] (discussing various tactics that employers use to
confine domestic workers to their home, including withholding passports, limiting or
denying workers the right to leave their home, forbidding workers to speak with
strangers, and distorting U.S. law and culture so that workers are afraid to leave the
house).
5. See Complaint at ¶ 12, Begum (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (No. 99-11834) (explaining that
despite Begum’s employment contract stipulating that the Salehs would pay her $5.15
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Illiterate and unable to speak English, Begum felt trapped and alone; this
predicament, however, began to change when she overheard a fruit vendor
speaking her native Bengali during one of her few moments outside of the
apartment.6 She made her escape after finding her way back to the vendor
and divulging her story.7 With the help of local attorneys, she sued her
employers in federal court, but the judge deferred to a statement submitted
by the U.S. Department of State (“State Department”), and ruled that the
Salehs had diplomatic immunity pursuant to the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (“VCDR”). This international treaty, which governs
diplomatic relations and immunity privileges, prevents U.S. courts from
exercising jurisdiction to adjudicate civil claims against diplomats unless
certain exceptions apply.8
This Comment examines the rights and remedies of the tens of thousands
of domestic workers in the United States who, like Begum, enter on special
visas and then confront the defense of diplomatic immunity when they seek
to vindicate their rights.9 Specifically, this Comment focuses on workers
with A-3 visas, which are temporary work visas reserved for domestic
workers of ambassadors, consular officials, and other diplomats based in
the United States.10 Foreign government officials often will use this visa
category to hire domestic workers and bring them to the United States to
care for the children of the government officials and assume household
chores and responsibilities. This Comment also addresses the plight of
domestic workers on G-5 visas, which is a similar visa designated for
per hour and provide her free room and board, Begum earned only one hundred dollars
a month, which her employers sent directly to her husband in Bangladesh, so she never
saw her earnings); see also Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1996)
(requiring employers to pay employees at least $5.15 per hour); Dole v. Bishop, 740 F.
Supp. 1221, 1229 (S.D. Miss. 1990) (explaining that employers who violate FLSA
wage provisions essentially are making a profit from what is owed to their employees).
6. See Sengupta, supra note 1, at B1 (recounting how Mrs. Saleh ordered Begum
to walk faster and stated “America bad, America bad” when Begum noticed the fruit
vendors speaking Bengali, whom she later made her way back to when the Salehs left
town).
7. See id. (explaining how the vendor reported the story to a Bengali-language
newspaper who then contacted Andolan, a South Asian workers’ rights organization).
8. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 31(1), Apr. 18, 1961, 23
U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter VCDR] (stipulating that diplomats have
immunity from criminal and civil jurisdiction except civil actions related to immovable
property for personal use, where the diplomat has engaged in a commercial activity
outside diplomatic functions, and in succession actions where the diplomat is acting as
an executor in a personal capacity).
9. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DEP’T OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, VISA STATISTICS,
http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/statistics/statistics_1476.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2007)
(reporting that the State Department has granted over 18,500 A-3 visas in the past ten
years); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 4 (informing that the government
issued over 30,000 A-3 and G-5 visas in the 1990s).
10. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(A)(iii) (2006) (classifying A-3 visa holders as
“attendants, servants, [and] personal employees” of foreign government officials).
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domestic workers employed by officials of international organizations,
whom also may face legal hurdles in suing their employers.11
Because courts look to the executive branch for guidance in determining
whether diplomats are immune from suit, the State Department plays a
critical role in protecting the rights of domestic workers, ensuring their
access to courts, and preventing diplomats from abusing their immunity
privileges.12 This Comment asserts that the State Department should guide
courts to apply an alternative interpretation of the VCDR’s immunity
exceptions, rather than the current, narrower interpretation, which allows
diplomats to hide behind a shield of diplomatic immunity and consequently
prevents domestic workers from litigating their claims. Alternatively, if the
State Department determines that employment of domestic workers by
diplomats does not fit within an immunity exception, it should follow its
policy for domestic workers who bring claims against employers who are
consular officers and employees that work for other foreign state officials.
Under this policy, the State Department requests waivers of immunity from
sending states when domestic workers file claims against diplomats for
criminal and/or civil violations. This process would thereby grant U.S.
courts jurisdiction to hear claims brought by domestic workers against their
diplomat employers.
Background part I provides background regarding the legal challenges
that domestic workers face and how diplomatic immunity compounds these
obstacles. Background part II examines the State Department regulations
and practices relating to diplomatic immunity. Background part III
describes the current interpretation of the VCDR as it pertains to domestic
workers employed by diplomats. The remaining sections in Background
parts IV and V provide an overview on the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (“VCCR”) and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”),
and describes how courts have interpreted the various authorities governing
consular and foreign sovereign immunities. To justify an alternative
interpretation of the VCDR that accommodates the rights and remedies of
domestic workers and argues that a request for waiver of immunity from
the sending state is consistent with U.S. laws, Analysis part I analyzes and
compares the different employment relationships between foreign
government officials and domestic workers as detailed in the VCDR,

11. See, e.g., Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01-7224, 2002 WL 1964806, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 23, 2002) (dismissing an action brought by a former domestic worker against a
UN diplomat because her employer had diplomatic immunity under the VCDR); see 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(G)(v) (2006).
12. See Traore v. State, 431 A.2d 96, 99 (Md. 1981) (explaining that courts defer to
the State Department to determine whether a diplomat has immunity to avoid
interference with foreign relations but courts still have authority to resolve issues of
law, including interpretations of statutes).
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VCCR, and FSIA, and emphasizes that an alternative interpretation of the
VCDR or a request to waive immunity will not undermine diplomatic
functions. Analysis part II suggests mechanisms that the State Department
should implement to protect the rights and remedies of domestic workers.
This Comment concludes that the State Department should exercise its
authority to intervene to protect the rights and remedies of domestic
workers and prevent abusive employers from using diplomatic immunity as
a shield.
BACKGROUND
I. THE LEGAL BARRIERS FACING DOMESTIC WORKERS EMPLOYED BY
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN THE UNITED STATES
Unfortunately, the experience of Shamela Begum—a migrant domestic
worker, who found herself in an abusive and humiliating environment
where she worked long hours and received well below the minimum
wage—is common to domestic employees working for foreign government
officials on special temporary work visas.13 While there is no official
figure indicating how many diplomats violate the rights of their workers,
the cases filed in court, covered by the media, and reported upon by nongovernmental organizations demonstrate that the problem is pervasive and
underreported.14 These workers, the majority of whom are women of color,
often are not allowed to leave the employers’ home, and in some cases,
experience physical, psychological, and/or sexual abuse at the hands of
their employers.15 In the most egregious cases, the manner in which the
workers are brought to the United States and their work conditions
constitute human trafficking and slavery.16 Because of linguistic, cultural,
13. See, e.g., Complaint at ¶¶ 2-3, 37-54, Gonzalez Paredes v. Vila, 479 F. Supp.
2d 187 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 06-00089); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4,
at 1 (finding that, out of forty-three cases of migrant domestic workers, the median
hourly earnings were $2.14 for fourteen hour workdays).
14. See Testimony of Elizabeth Keyes Before the Inter-American Commission for
Human Rights, Oct. 14, 2005 (on file with author) [hereinafter Testimony of Keyes]
(stating that as an attorney for CASA of Maryland, a community legal services
organization that focuses on workers’ rights, she has dealt with two dozen cases over
two years where diplomats have exploited workers).
15. See HOME IS WHERE THE WORK IS, supra note 2, at 2 (finding that ninety-three
percent of domestic workers in New York City are women; ninety-five percent are
people of color; sixty-seven percent earn low wages or below minimum wage; thirtythree have been in an abusive or uncomfortable situation with their employers; and
ninety percent do not receive health care from employers).
16. See United States v. Veerapol, 312 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
that the wife of a Thai ambassador committed involuntary servitude when she abused
and threatened her workers through legal action, physical force, and even threatened to
take their lives); see also Margaret Murphy, Modern Day Slavery: The Trafficking of
Women to the United States, 9 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 11, 12 (2001) (approximating that
50,000 women and children are trafficked to the United States, many by foreign
diplomats).
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political, and legal barriers, most of these workers cannot find redress in
the U.S. legal system.17
U.S. regulations and laws also largely have neglected domestic workers
who are subject to abuse from their employers.18 Federal laws mandating
overtime pay, safe work conditions, and anti-discrimination laws do not
protect live-in domestic workers, regardless of who their employers are,
because live-in domestic work often is considered in the private sphere and
is thus, unregulated.19 In the context of domestic workers employed by
foreign government officials, the Departments of State and Labor do not
monitor the employment relationship; to obtain the special visa for a
domestic worker, the government only requires the employer to submit a
visa application and an employment contract.20 The lack of government
oversight, stronger laws to protect domestic workers, and enforcement
mechanisms not only contribute to the workers’ vulnerability, but
essentially place the burden on them to seek redress.21 Domestic workers
employed by diplomats are the most vulnerable to abuse since their access
to justice is complicated by their employers’ ability to invoke immunity,
which may bar courts from exercising jurisdiction over the workers’ claims
when none of the three VCDR immunity exceptions apply, as illustrated in
17. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 6, 32 (stressing the isolation of
domestic workers when they are unfamiliar with local customs and laws, unaware of
their rights or available resources to seek redress, and receive threats from their
employers to deport them or retaliate against their families).
18. See id. at 27-30 (outlining the lack of legal protections for domestic workers:
(1) lack of government enforcement to monitor employment contracts; (2) restrictions
on changing employers while maintaining legal status; (3) exclusion of domestic
workers under the National Labor Relations Act; (4) no sexual harassment protection
under Title VII; (5) exclusion of live-in domestic workers under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act; and (6) no FLSA requirement of overtime pay for live-in
domestic workers).
19. See Donna E. Young, Working Across Borders: Global Restructuring and
Women’s Work, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 1, 65-68 (2001) (critiquing the gendered spheres
doctrine where the public sphere is the market and government, and the private sphere
is viewed as “women’s work,” such as housekeeping); see also NATIONAL
EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, JUSTICE FOR WORKERS: STATE AGENCIES CAN COMBAT
WAGE THEFT 11 (2006), http://www.nelp.org/docUploads/Justice_for_Workers.pdf
(last visited Dec. 1 2007).
20. See 9 F.A.M. § 41.21 n.6.2 (2001) (indicating that consular officers can deny
visa applications that do not adhere to the requirements by not submitting an
employment contract signed by both parties to indicate their agreement to a fair wage,
including a promise by the employee not to accept other employment, and terms
regarding the employee’s freedom to maintain possession of his/her passport and to
leave the employer’s home when off duty); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra
note 4, at 2 (explaining that contracts are not enforced or monitored by the Department
of Labor, nor kept on record with either the State Department or the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service).
21. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 1 (explaining that the burden that
workers face in seeking redress is further compounded by the fact that employmentbased visas imply that workers in abusive situations face the dilemma of staying in the
abusive environment or escaping and losing their immigration status).
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Begum’s case.22
II. THE ROLE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN SAFEGUARDING THE RIGHTS
AND REMEDIES OF DOMESTIC WORKERS
The Foreign Affairs Manual (“FAM”), which sets forth the
responsibilities of the State Department in conducting international
relations, outlines U.S. policies and procedures regarding the immunities
and liabilities of foreign government officials working in the United
States.23 Diplomatic agents and their family members enjoy complete
immunity from criminal suits and some immunity from civil suits.24
Consular personnel enjoy immunity only for actions conducted in their
official capacity; they have no immunity for acts conducted outside of their
consular functions.25
Despite these immunity privileges, the State Department has a general
policy to request waivers of immunity from the diplomat’s government for
criminal cases brought against foreign personnel, which provides U.S.
courts with jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute these cases as
necessary.26 The State Department can proceed without requesting a
22. See GLOBAL RIGHTS ET AL., DOMESTIC WORKERS’ RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES: A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE IN RESPONSE
TO THE 2ND AND 3RD PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES, at 10-12, available at
http://www.globalrights.org/site/DocServer/Domestic_Workers_report-_FINAL.pdf?
docID=5503 (arguing that preventing workers from adjudicating claims violates
international laws, specifically, Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights). Compare United States v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d 994, 999, 1005 (1st Cir.
1995) (convicting a Kuwaiti national studying in the United States of involuntary
servitude when he and his wife exploited, physically abused, and threatened the life of
a domestic worker on a B-1 visa, which can be used by domestic employees working
for foreign nationals—who are not diplomats—in the United States), with Testimony of
Keyes, supra note 14, at 3 (describing a story where a diplomat’s wife told a domestic
worker, while physically abusing the employee, that the police would be useless
because the wife had diplomatic immunity).
23. See generally 1 F.A.M. § 011 (2001).
24. See 2 F.A.M. § 232.1-1 (1991) (explaining that diplomatic agents and their
family members benefit from the highest degree of privileges and immunities and that
U.S. law enforcement officials may not arrest or detain them, are prohibited from
searching their property, cannot prosecute criminal offenses without a waiver of
immunity from the sending state, and U.S. courts can only exercise civil jurisdiction
under certain exceptions).
25. See 2 F.A.M. § 232.2 (1991).
26. See 2 F.A.M. § 233.3 (1991) (indicating that under exceptional circumstances,
the State Department may require a diplomat to leave the country if the sending state
does not waive immunity where the State Department has requested a waiver to
investigate criminal allegations); Libby Lewis, U.S. Ousts Kuwaiti Diplomat,
Investigates Tanzania (N.P.R. Nov. 6, 2007), available at http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=16035332 (reporting that the State Department—for
the first time—forced a Kuwaiti diplomat to leave his post at the embassy in
Washington D.C. as a result of alleged trafficking of domestic workers to the United
States and involuntary servitude). The State Department, in this case, requested a
waiver of immunity from Kuwait, but was denied such a request. Id. See also Lena H.
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waiver from the diplomat’s mission or government when there are
outweighing foreign relations, national security, or humanitarian
concerns.27 In civil cases, the FAM articulates the State Department’s right
to intervene where the complainant can demonstrate that: (1) the
governmental official owes the person a debt or civil liability; (2) attempts
to address the issue with the diplomatic agent and the head of mission have
failed; and (3) immunity would prevent adjudicatory or administrative
action.28 The State Department, however, has not articulated a clear
process for the complainant to demonstrate the existence of a claim and
how the Department would investigate the claim.29
The State Department also sets forth provisions to address abuse of
immunity privileges.30 The FAM makes evident that diplomatic immunity
does not grant a license for diplomats to deprive domestic workers of their
rights to fair wages.31 It specifically provides that the Fair Labor Standards
Act (“FLSA”) covers A-3 employees and advises that employers not
withhold their employees’ passports or prohibit their freedom of
movement.32 As previously mentioned, in order for foreign officials to
obtain A-3 visas for domestic employees, the State Department requires
that they submit a contract, which includes the above terms to ensure that
employees understand their rights and duties.33 These required contract
Sun, “Modern-Day Slavery” Prompts Rescue Efforts; Groups Target Abuse of Foreign
Maids, WASH. POST, May 3, 2004, at A1 (reporting that the U.S. Attorney’s Office in
Maryland prosecuted six domestic worker cases between 2000 and 2004).
27. See 2 F.A.M. § 232.4(b) (1991) (suggesting that a humanitarian concern exists
if one’s presence in the United States is dangerous or harmful, or one’s health or safety
is in jeopardy).
28. See 2 F.A.M. § 234.2 (1991).
29. See id.
30. See 2 F.A.M. § 233.1 (1991) (recognizing the diplomatic community may
abuse its privileges and setting forth procedures, such as requesting waivers of
immunity from the sending state when there are criminal allegations or intervening in
civil cases where the complainant can demonstrate that a civil liability exists); cf. The
Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Specific Groups and
Individuals: Migrant Workers, ¶ 59 n.21, delivered to the Economic and Social
Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/76 (Jan. 12, 2004) (noting that some international
organizations, such as the World Bank, have implemented codes of conduct to address
their member officials exploiting domestic employees).
31. See 9 F.A.M. § 41.22 n.4.3, n.4.4 (2001) (noting that FLSA does not require
live-in employees to receive overtime pay, but states may require overtime wages for
live-in employees).
32. See 9 F.A.M. § 41.22 n.4.4 (2001).
33. See id. (noting that contracts should be in English and if necessary, a language
that the employee understands); see also Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Beyond Nannygate:
Using the Inter-American Human Rights System in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON GENDER
AND MIGRATION: EMPOWERMENT, RIGHTS, AND ENTITLEMENTS 7-8 (Nicola Piper ed.,
2007) (observing that contracts often are not written in a language that employees
understand or not given to employees at all, and that employers have told employees
that contracts were not binding or altered provisions so that it offered no protection to
workers).
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provisions are also published in Circular Diplomatic Notes, which are
issued by the State Department’s Office of Foreign Missions and
distributed to foreign government officials in the United States, and express
concern for diplomats who abuse their privileges and exploit their personal
domestic employees.34
These policies are consistent with international law, which stipulates that
those who enjoy certain privileges and immunities as foreign government
officials in the United States also must respect the country’s laws and
regulations.35 In practice, however, the State Department has strayed from
these policies; instead of requesting a waiver of immunity from the sending
state when complainants allege that diplomats abused and violated U.S.
law, the State Department submitted Statements of Interest to courts that
confirm that diplomats have immunity from civil jurisdiction under the
VCDR.36 These Statements of Interest generally are binding on courts,
whereby domestic workers are precluded from litigating their claims when
the State Department asserts that diplomats have immunity and that the
immunity exceptions do not apply.37
The State Department justifies its actions by invoking theories of
functional necessity and reciprocity.38 It asserts that safeguarding the
immunity privileges of diplomats based in the United States ensures that
the interests of U.S. diplomats who are based in other countries also are
protected.39 Thus, diplomatic immunity is intended to facilitate diplomatic
34. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF FOREIGN MISSIONS, CIRCULAR
DIPLOMATIC NOTE ON DOMESTIC EMPLOYEES (June 19, 2000), available at
http://www.state.gov/ofm/31311.htm [hereinafter CIRCULAR DIPLOMATIC NOTE OF
JUNE 2000] (reserving the right to deny a diplomat’s visa application for a domestic
employee if it reasonably suspects that the diplomat violated past employment
provisions and obligations).
35. See VCDR, supra note 8, art. 41.
36. See Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01-7224, 2002 WL 1964806, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
23, 2002) (adhering to a Statement of Interest from the State Department that
confirmed the Economics Minister for the Permanent Mission of Bangladesh had the
same VCDR immunity privileges as a diplomat pursuant to the Convention on
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, and the Agreement between the
United Nations and the United States Regarding the Headquarters of the United
Nations); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 35 (finding that between 1995 and
2001, the State Department had only intervened in one civil case—Ahmed v. Hoque—
regarding a diplomat’s abuse of his domestic worker, and only to the extent that it
mediated a settlement between the parties). But see Lewis, supra note 26 (discussing
the first case where the State Department has intervened to request a waiver of
immunity from the Kuwaiti government to prosecute a Kuwaiti diplomat based in the
United States who allegedly held his domestic workers in slavery conditions).
37. Abdulaziz v. Metro. Dade County, 741 F.2d 1328, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 1984)
(dismissing claims brought against Saudi Arabian diplomats because the State
Department’s Statement of Interest is binding on the court).
38. Statement of Interest of the United States at 4, Gonzalez Paredes v. Vila, No.
06-0089 (D.D.C. Jan. 26, 2007).
39. Id. at 2, 6; see Diplomatic Immunity and U.S. Interests: Statement on H.R. 3036
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missions in carrying out their official functions in representing the sending
states without interference.40
III. THE CURRENT INTERPRETATION OF THE VCDR COMMERCIAL
ACTIVITY EXCEPTION APPLIED IN TABION V. MUFTI
Like the FAM, the VCDR also requires diplomats to respect the laws of
the receiving state and provides that the purpose of diplomatic immunity is
not to benefit individuals. The VCDR, which Congress codified through
the Diplomatic Relations Act,41 further articulates exceptions to immunity
from civil and administrative jurisdiction, including a commercial activity
exception.42 As articulated above, the State Department has the authority to
request waivers of immunity from sending states and its Statement of
Interests, interpreting a diplomat’s immunity privileges under the VCDR,
are generally binding on courts.43
The VCDR does not define commercial activity explicitly nor does its
negotiation history provide a clear definition.44 The VCDR, however, lists
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 100th Cong. 8-9 (1987) (statement of
Ambassador Selwa Roosevelt, Chief of Protocol of the United States) (suggesting that
other countries will retaliate against U.S. officials abroad if the United States
unilaterally lessens immunity privileges of diplomats).
40. See Diplomatic Immunity and U.S. Interests: Statement on H.R. 3036 Before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 100th Cong. 8-9 (1987) (statement of
Ambassador Selwa Roosevelt, Chief of Protocol of the United States) (asserting that
immunity privileges are not intended to benefit individuals but ensure that all diplomats
work in an independent and secure environment without fear of incarceration).
41. Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. § 254 (a)-(e) (2007) (codifying
the VCDR into federal law despite the self-executing nature of the international treaty,
and repealing legislation that was inconsistent with the VCDR, which provided
complete civil immunity for diplomats). The Act brought U.S. diplomatic relations law
consistent with international diplomatic relations law. Id. See also Foreign Missions
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 4304(b) (1982) (addressing how the State Department can further the
interests of foreign missions in the United States and U.S. missions abroad while
protecting the interests of individuals in the United States by stipulating that the
Secretary of State submit an annual report detailing allegations of “serious criminal
offenses,” such as a felony, committed by diplomats, and disclosing cases to Congress
where the State Department has requested waivers of immunity from sending states).
42. See VCDR, supra note 8, art. 31(1).
43. See 2 F.A.M. § 234.1-1 (1991) (providing that the State Department will
provide a certification of immunity, indicating whether the diplomat has immunity and
the scope of that immunity, to law enforcement officials, U.S. courts, and attorneys,
when a diplomat has allegedly committed a crime); see also 2 F.A.M. § 234.2 (1991).
44. See VCDR, supra note 8, art. 31(1); U.N. Conference on Diplomatic
Intercourse and Immunities, 36th mtg. at ¶¶ 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.20/14 (Mar. 30,
1961) [hereinafter U.N. Conference] (discussing whether investing in a company is a
commercial activity, but not revealing a definitive answer); see also Report of the
International Law Commission to the General Assembly: Diplomatic Intercourse and
Immunities, Summary of Observations Received from Governments and Conclusions of
the Special Rapporteur, 10th Commission, at 56, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/116 (May 2, 1958)
[hereinafter Report of the Commission] (noting that commercial activity should be a
continuous act rather than a single act of commerce).
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several functions of a diplomatic mission and although the list is not
exhaustive, none of the specified functions explicitly or implicitly include
the employment of a domestic worker as an official function.45
Nonetheless, courts, following the guidance of the State Department, have
ruled that employment of domestic workers is not a professional or
commercial activity outside the official functions of the diplomat.46
Instead, courts have applied a narrower interpretation of commercial
activity and held that it does not include “occasional service contracts” that
are “incidental to the daily life of the diplomat” and that commercial
activity “relates only to trade or business activity engaged in for personal
profit.”47 The Fourth Circuit applied such an interpretation in Tabion v.
Mufti where Corazon Tabion, a domestic worker from the Philippines, sued
Faris Mufti, a Jordanian diplomat based in Washington D.C., for violating
the terms of her employment contract.48 The court reiterated the
conclusions in the State Department’s Statement of Interest submitted in
support of the Muftis’ diplomatic immunity and barred Tabion from
adjudicating her claims against her employers.49 The Fourth Circuit’s
decision not only prevented Tabion’s access to the courts, but it also has
substantially influenced subsequent cases and denied rights and remedies to
others in similar abusive situations.50
45. See VCDR, supra note 8, art. 3(1) (providing examples of the functions of
diplomatic missions, such as (1) representation of sending states; (2) protection of
sending states’ nationals and state interests; (3) negotiation and communication with
receiving states; and (4) cultivation of friendly relations between states); see also
EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: A COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 252 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2d ed. 2002) (1998) (noting that it is
unclear whether the drafters of the VCDR intended Article 3 to serve as a reference in
determining the scope of diplomatic functions under Article 31(1)(c)—the commercial
activity exception—because of the ambiguous boundaries between activities deemed
commercial and those that are incidental to diplomatic functions).
46. See, e.g., Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 538-39 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that
“day-to-day living services such as dry cleaning or domestic help” were not outside a
diplomat’s official functions and such “occasional service contracts” were not
commercial activity under the VCDR).
47. See id. at 537 (reading “for personal profit” into the commercial activity
exception in Article 31(1)(c) of the VCDR, which does not explicitly state this
element). But see BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 (1994) (providing
that if Congress includes specific language in one section of a statute but excludes it
another section, then Congress intended the language’s exclusion in the latter).
48. See Brief of Appellant Corazon Tabion at 5-6, Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535
(4th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-1732) (alleging violations of the FLSA when Mufti paid
Tabion only $0.50 per hour for eighteen-hour workdays from August 1991 to
December 1993, breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation in employment, and
false imprisonment).
49. See Tabion, 73 F.3d at 539 (explaining that the court’s decision to dismiss the
case, despite its unfairness, reflects policy choices that Congress and the Executive
Branch have already determined in balancing the purpose of diplomatic immunity and
the private interest of the aggrieved party).
50. See, e.g., Statement of Interest of the United States at 10 n.6, Begum v. Saleh,
No. 99-11834 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2000) (relying on Tabion to assert that the VCDR
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IV. THE VCCR’S SCOPE OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS AND PARK V. SHIN
The VCDR governs the immunity privileges of diplomats and exceptions
to such privileges, while the VCCR governs immunity privileges of
consular officials.51 It may be useful to compare these two conventions,
courts’ interpretation of these conventions, and the courts’ application of
these standards to similar facts to determine whether there is a fundamental
difference between domestic workers’ employment relationships with
diplomats and their relationships with consular officers, such that the
former employer would be afforded immunity privileges whereas the latter
would likely not have immunity.52 In contrast to the VCDR’s provisions
on diplomats, the VCCR grants consular officials immunity only with
respect to actions that arise in the exercise of their official functions.53 The
VCCR also specifically states that consular officials do not have immunity
with regards to contract claims where the officers do not expressly or
impliedly contract as agents of sending states.54 Thus, U.S. case law
demonstrates that a domestic worker employed by a consular official has an
opportunity to adjudicate claims against her employer.55 This was the case
in Park v. Shin where the Ninth Circuit found that Shin, the consular
official, was not performing his consular functions when he hired and
supervised Park as a domestic worker.56 Thus, Park could continue with
commercial activity exception is not relevant where a UN diplomat has employed a
domestic worker); Statement of Interest of the United States at 6-7, Gonzalez Paredes
v. Vila, No. 06-0089 (D.D.C. Jan. 26, 2007) (following Tabion to illustrate that the
VCDR commercial activity does not pertain to a diplomat’s employment of a domestic
worker).
51. Compare VCDR, supra note 8, arts. 1(e), 31 (defining a diplomatic agent as a
member of a country’s diplomatic mission in a receiving state and establishing
diplomatic immunity from criminal and most civil prosecution), with Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations arts. 1(d)-(e), 43, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596
U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCR] (defining consular officers and employees
respectively as any person entrusted with consular functions or with administrative or
technical functions and establishing consular immunity from prosecution in the
receiving state for duties performed when carrying out their consular functions).
52. Compare Park v. Shin, 313 F.3d 1138, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that
the consular officer hired the domestic worker as a personal employee, so he is not
protected by any immunity privileges of the VCCR), with Tabion, 73 F.3d at 539
(holding that a diplomat’s employment of a domestic worker is “incidental to daily
life” and part of diplomatic functions, such that the diplomat, under the VCDR, is
immune from suit by the domestic employee in U.S. federal courts).
53. VCCR, supra note 51, art. 43.
54. Id.
55. See Opening Brief of Appellant Tae Sook Park at 3-4, 8-9, Park v. Shin, 313
F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-16805) (concluding that a domestic worker
employed by a consular official could bring suit against her employer because the
consular officer acted outside his official functions when he hired her to perform
services, such as cooking for his family, and paid her an average wage of $1.00 per
hour, which was well below the minimum wage).
56. 313 F.3d at 1143.
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her suit.57 To reach this conclusion, the Park court applied a two-prong
test: (1) “whether the functions asserted are ‘legitimate consular
functions;’” and (2) whether the acts performed by the consular officer are
in the scope of his legitimate consular functions.58
V. THE FSIA AND THE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY EXCEPTION
In contrast to the VCDR and the VCCR, which govern individual
diplomatic and consular immunity respectively, the FSIA is a statute
enacted in 1976 that authorizes U.S. courts to determine whether foreign
states and their instrumentalities qualify for sovereign immunity.59 Despite
the sovereign state and diplomat being different legal entities, it is useful to
consider the FSIA in understanding the VCDR and the commercial activity
exception as it is applied to diplomats who employ domestic workers
because both the FSIA and VCDR invoke standards that attempt to balance
the public interest—in promoting foreign relations—and the interest of
private individuals.60 Even though the FSIA does not explicitly state that
individuals can claim sovereign immunity, courts have interpreted that
individuals can invoke immunity if they can demonstrate that the functions
they performed were within their official capacity as agents of a foreign
sovereign.61 The statute codified the restrictive immunity theory, which
provided that foreign sovereigns enjoy immunity privileges for public acts

57. See id.; VCCR, supra note 51, art. 43 (providing that consular officials do not
have immunity if acting outside official functions).
58. See Park, 313 F.3d at 1141-43. The court found Shin’s argument too
attenuated and concluded that any services performed that benefited the consulate were
incidental to Park’s job as a personal servant. Id.
59. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1605
(2006) (giving foreign states immunity from jurisdiction of courts with the exception of
commercial activity, among other noted exceptions); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487,
at 7 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606 (articulating intent to
transfer sovereign immunity issues from executive branch to judicial branch, which is a
common practice in many countries, to avoid political and diplomatic pressures and
ensure that judicial decisions are grounded in the law).
60. See Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 539 (4th Cir. 1996) (comparing the similarity
of cases invoking sovereign immunity with those invoking diplomatic immunity, such
that the “inequity to a private individual [that results from the immunity privileges] is
outweighed by the great injury to the public that would arise from permitting suit
against the entity or its agents calling for application of immunity”).
61. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (defining agency or instrumentality of foreign state as a
separate legal person or an organ of the foreign state); Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l
Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 1990) (declaring that suing an individual acting in
his official capacity is the “practical equivalent” of suing the foreign state so that
individuals, in this context, can invoke immunity); cf. Trajano v. Marcos (In re Estate
of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litig.), 978 F.2d 493, 497-98 (9th Cir. 1992)
(concluding that the daughter of a former Philippine President could not invoke
sovereign immunity because acts of torture and arbitrary killing were outside the scope
of her official functions under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”).
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but not private commercial acts.62
The FSIA defines commercial activity as “either a regular course of
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act,” and the
legal standard—known as the private actor test—is to look to the nature of
the act rather than its purpose and whether the commercial activity has a
direct effect on the United States.63 The nature of the activity is
commercial if a private party can engage in the act, as opposed to a noncommercial act that is exclusive to foreign sovereigns.64 In a number of
cases, employees successfully have sought relief under the FSIA from their
employers who are foreign governments officials based in the United
States.65 For example, in Segni v. Commercial Office of Spain and ElHadad v. Embassy of the U.A.E., the Seventh Circuit and the District Court
for the District of Columbia respectively concluded that the foreign state
could not invoke sovereign immunity because the employment of the
complainants fell within the commercial activity exception.66
Alternatively, in Butters v. Vance International, Inc., a corporation that
specialized in security services invoked FSIA immunity as a defense to a
suit brought by a former employee and the Fourth Circuit held that the
corporation was immune from suit because decisions as to how to secure
and protect the safety of a government premise and its occupants are
governmental in nature.67
62. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (justifying the shift from
absolute immunity to restrictive immunity to accommodate modernization, where
foreign states have become regular participants in markets and those engaging in
commercial activities with foreign states should have a way to seek redress in U.S.
courts if needed).
63. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 16 (clarifying that even if the ultimate objective
of the activity is for public purpose, such as buying military equipment or repairing an
embassy building, it is commercial if private actors can also perform the act).
64. See, e.g., Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 616-17 (1992) (concluding that
issuance of bonds was a commercial activity rather than a sovereign act because private
parties issue bonds).
65. See, e.g., Al Mukaddam v. Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia to the United
Nations, 111 F. Supp. 2d 457, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (concluding that a former
employee, who helped draft speeches that articulated government policy, could sue the
Saudi Arabia mission because a private actor can just as likely hire someone to perform
such tasks and the employee did not contribute to the actual development of Saudi
Arabia’s policies).
66. See Segni v. Commercial Office of Spain, 835 F.2d 160, 165 (7th Cir. 1987)
(characterizing Segni’s duties to market Spanish wines in the United States as “product
marketing,” something done by many private persons and individual businesses); ElHadad v. Embassy of the United Arab Emirates, No. 96-1943, 2006 WL 826098, at *7
(D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2006) (holding that the former employee, an internal auditor for the
U.A.E. mission, was not a civil servant, and could continue with her suit against her
employer because a private actor can hire internal auditors).
67. 225 F.3d 462, 466 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that the corporation, Vance
International, could invoke sovereign immunity under the FSIA as a result of derivative
immunity if it relied on Saudi Arabia’s orders to properly secure government property,
which is an act deemed unique to sovereigns).
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In Park v. Shin, the Shins also attempted to claim sovereign immunity
under the FSIA, but the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument.68 The court
concluded that Mr. Shin was not a foreign sovereign as defined by the
FSIA because an individual can only invoke sovereign immunity if they are
acting within their official capacity, and the court deemed that he was
acting outside of his official duties when he hired and supervised Park.69 It
further emphasized that even if Shin could invoke the FSIA, the
commercial activity exception would apply because a private person can
also hire and supervise a domestic worker.70
ANALYSIS
I. THERE IS AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE VCDR
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY EXCEPTION THAT PROVIDES DOMESTIC
WORKERS ACCESS TO COURTS THAT IS ALSO HARMONIOUS WITH THE
VCDR AND U.S. LAWS AND REGULATIONS
The State Department’s narrow interpretation of the VCDR commercial
activity exception currently excludes the employment of domestic
workers.71 This interpretation not only contributes to the exploitation of
domestic workers who work for diplomats, but it also is inconsistent with
the State Department’s own policies to prevent abuse of immunity
privileges by intervening in civil cases when immunity would preclude
judicial action.72 Moreover, the current interpretation does not address how
a diplomat-domestic worker relationship substantively differs from that of
consular official-domestic worker or foreign state agent-domestic worker.
Why is someone engaging in the same work for equally demanding hours
and being paid well below the minimum wage barred from suit simply
because her employer is a diplomat, as opposed to a consular officer or an

68. 313 F.3d 1138, 1143 n.4 (9th Cir. 2002).
69. Id. at 1144-45.
70. Id. (asserting that even if Shin employed Park to assist with serving consulate

guests at Shin’s home, the purpose is irrelevant because the statute looks to the nature
of the activity rather than purpose when considering if the commercial activity
exception applies).
71. See, e.g., Statement of Interest of the United States at 2, Gonzalez Paredes v.
Vila, No. 06-0089 (D.D.C. Jan. 26, 2007) (asserting that diplomats are immune from
suit because employment of domestic workers does not fall within the VCDR
commercial activity exception even if it is deemed commercial activity under the FSIA
because the VCDR and FSIA refer to different doctrines and histories).
72. See 2 F.A.M. § 234.2(b) (1991) (articulating that the State Department will
intervene where the aggrieved party can show: (1) a diplomat owes him/her a debt; (2)
he/she has unsuccessfully attempted to address the matters with the head of the
mission; and (3) immunity would prevent the aggrieved party from obtaining redress
through judicial or administrative action); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note
4, at 22 (noting that the U.S. government, aware of its lack of rigor in addressing the
abuse of domestic workers, would only be interviewed under conditions of anonymity).
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agent of a foreign state?73 As the facts of Park and Tabion illustrate, there
is essentially no difference between the employment relationships of a
diplomat and a domestic employee and of a consular official and a
domestic employee.74 Yet diplomats who employ domestic workers are
immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts whereas domestic workers
who are employed by consular officers, foreign state agents, and private
individuals can sue in U.S. courts when those employers violate their
employment contract as a personal employee.75 If functional necessity and
reciprocity are the justifications for upholding the diplomat’s immunity
privileges, why are these concerns outweighed by protections for the
individual in the context of immunity for consular officers and foreign state
agents, at least in the context of employment of domestic workers?76
The negotiation history of the VCDR notes that a commercial activity is
a continuous act, but it does not provide a clear definition of commercial
activity.77 Nonetheless, the VCDR’s negotiation history makes evident that
73. Compare United States v. Veerapol, 312 F.3d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir. 2002)
(concluding that the employer, who was a common law wife of a Thai ambassador, was
guilty of involuntary servitude when she brought Thai nationals on visitor visas to the
United States, ordered them to work at least twelve-hour days, paid them between $240
and $360 per month to cook, clean, and take care of her child, confiscated their
passports, prohibited them from speaking to anyone, and threatened them verbally and
physically), with Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01-7224, 2002 WL 1964806, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 23, 2002) (holding that the domestic employee of a UN foreign minister could not
sue his employers because of diplomatic immunity, despite allegedly forcing him to
cook and clean fourteen to seventeen-hour days, every day of the week, providing him
with a small stipend but no salary, subjecting him to verbal and physical abuse, and
withholding his travel documents).
74. Compare Opening Brief of Appellant Tae Sook Park at 3-4, Park v. Shin, 313
F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-16805) (noting that the Shins hired a domestic
worker to cook, clean, and care for the consular official’s children for over twelve
hours per day, every day of week at an average hourly wage of one dollar), with Brief
of Appellant Corazon Tabion at 5, Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 1996) (No.
95-1732) (noting that the Mufti’s employed a domestic worker to cook, clean, and care
for the diplomat’s children at least sixteen hours per day, every day of week at an
average hourly wage of fifty cents).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d 994, 999, 1004-05 (1st Cir. 1995)
(finding the employer, a Kuwaiti national studying at Boston University, guilty of
involuntary servitude when he and his wife brought a Sri Lankan native to the United
States on a B-1 visa to clean their home for fifteen hours a day for $120 per month).
See generally 9 F.A.M. § 41.31 n.9.3 (2005) (explaining that B-1 visas can be issued to
domestic employees of U.S. citizens residing temporarily in the United States or certain
foreign nationals in the United States).
76. See Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 539 (4th Cir. 1996) (articulating that
sovereign immunity and diplomatic immunity are similar in that the “inequity to a
private individual is outweighed by the great injury to the public that would arise from
permitting suit against the entity or its agents calling for application of immunity”).
But see H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 8 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6606 (setting forth that the FSIA provides individuals with some remedy to obtain a
judgment against a foreign state under certain circumstances, such as a commercial
transaction).
77. See U.N. Conference, supra note 44, at ¶¶ 3-4 (indicating that that there was no
consensus on the definition of commercial activity; for example, one might consider a
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the purpose of the commercial activity exception is to ensure that third
parties are not “deprived of their ordinary remedies.”78 This intention is
further demonstrated in a resolution on civil claims adopted by the UN
Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, asserting that
diplomatic immunity is intended not to deprive individuals of their civil
remedies where adjudication of the claims would not interfere with
diplomatic functions.79
Thus, in considering the current interpretation of the VCDR commercial
activity exception, which deprives domestic workers of their remedies,
comparing the manner in which different courts analyzed employeremployee relationships in the context of the FSIA and the VCCR helps to
discern how courts should interpret the commercial activity exception of
the VCDR and what constitutes activities within the scope of a diplomat’s
official functions.80 The following subsections demonstrate that there is an
alternative interpretation of the VCDR commercial activity exception—one
that is not only harmonious with the VCDR and U.S. laws and regulations,
but that also ensures domestic workers have access to courts—that the State
Department and courts should adopt.
A. Diplomats Should Not Have Immunity From Civil Jurisdiction
Because Employment of Domestic Workers is Commercial in Nature
1. The U.S. Government Treats the Domestic Work Industry as a
Commercial Enterprise
Though much of the domestic work industry is unregulated, it is
undoubtedly a commercial enterprise.81 In New York City alone, there are
diplomat who is a stockholder of a company as commercial activity though different
countries disagreed whether this would be the case); Report of the Commission, supra
note 44, at 56.
78. See Report of the Commission, supra note 44, at 56 (emphasizing that the
purpose of the commercial activity exception is to allow aggrieved parties, as a result
of a commercial activity, to obtain a remedy where the diplomat has violated the law,
and that it would be inappropriate under these circumstances to request the aggrieved
parties to seek redress from the diplomat’s home state).
79. See U.N. Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, 12th plen.
Mtg., Apr. 15, 1961, Resolution on the Consideration of Civil Claims, 90 U.N. Doc
A/Conf.20/10/Add.1 (recommending sending states waive immunity where individuals
would be deprived of remedies that they would normally be entitled to, or at a
minimum, help facilitate a fair settlement if immunity is not waived).
80. See Letter from Gilda Brancato, Attorney-Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State to
Foreign Embassy 1, 3 (Oct. 23, 1990), available at http://www.state.gov
/documents/organization/28510.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Brancato] (applying the
rationale of the FSIA commercial activity exception with the VCDR and VCCR
mandate that foreign officials have to respect the receiving state laws, to conclude that
foreign missions, as employers, are engaging in commercial activity when they hire
employees and should be subjected to federal and state employment laws).
81. See Memorandum of Law for the ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
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somewhere between 200,000 and 600,000 domestic workers employed by
private families and government officials.82 Within the United States,
estimates of domestic workers range in the millions, from 1.13 million to
four million.83 Moreover, the Internal Revenue Service considers the
domestic work industry a commercial enterprise, requiring individuals—
not diplomats—who employ domestic workers in their home at an annual
salary of $1,500 or more in 2007, to report those wages and withhold taxes,
which are similar to requirements for businesses.84 Because many
households evade these taxes, the Internal Revenue Service estimated that
the government lost $1.2 billion in social security and Medicare taxes in
1998.85 The sheer figures illustrate that employment of domestic workers
is a commercial activity.86 Nonetheless, courts have interpreted it
otherwise.87
2. The VCDR Commercial Activity Exception Does Not
Only Refer to Activities for Personal Profit
The Tabion court relied on a Statement of Interest from the State
Department, which articulated a narrow interpretation of the VCDR’s
Article 31(1)(c) commercial activity exception such that it refers only to
activities for personal profit; however, Article 31(1)(c) does not

Plaintiff at 12-13, Gonzalez Paredes v. Vila 479 F. Supp. 2d 187 (D.D.C. 2007) (No.
06-00089) (asserting that domestic work is a lucrative commercial industry, one which
the U.S. government also recognizes and treats as a commercial enterprise through its
taxation system); see also HOME IS WHERE THE WORK IS, supra note 2, at 1, 11
(characterizing the New York City domestic work industry as the “invisible backbone
of [the city’s] economy” because domestic employees take on the responsibility of
household chores and child care, which allows their employers to work and earn more
money that ultimately expands the economy through increased spending).
82. HOME IS WHERE THE WORK IS, supra note 2, at 1 n.2 (explaining that the varied
figures of 200,000 and 600,000 domestic workers employed in New York City result
from the industry’s informal structure and difficulty in accounting for undocumented
workers).
83. David Cay Johnston, Despite an Easing of Rules, Millions Evade “Nanny Tax,”
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1998, § 1, at 1.
84. See Internal Revenue Service, Publication 926, available at http://www.irs.gov
/publications/ p926/ar02.html#d0e94 (last visited Mar. 23, 2007).
85. See Johnston, supra note 83, at 1 (explaining that many households that employ
domestic workers do not report the workers’ wages to the Internal Revenue Service
because the government is not rigorous in enforcing such violations).
86. See Memorandum of Law for the ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Plaintiff at 12, Gonzalez Paredes v. Vila, 479 F. Supp. 2d 187 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 0600089) (estimating that the one million nannies who work in U.S. homes generate a
multi-billion dollar enterprise).
87. See Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 537-38 (4th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the
VCDR commercial activity exception does not include employment of domestic
workers, which the court characterized as “occasional service contracts” incidental to
diplomatic functions).
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specifically state this.88 In comparison, the drafters explicitly stated in
Article 42 of the VCDR that a diplomatic agent is prohibited from
engaging in any professional or commercial activities “for personal profit”
in the receiving state.89 Interpreting Article 31(1)(c) to include personal
profit is contrary to the plain language of the VCDR.90 If the drafters
intended the commercial activity exception in Article 31(1)(c) to include
“for personal profit,” they would have explicitly stated it as they did in
Article 42.91 Furthermore, if Article 31(1)(c) and Article 42 both referred
to the commercial activity exception, then the drafters would not have
separated these provisions.92 Thus, the Tabion court misinterpreted Article
31(1)(c) by combining it with the terms of Article 42, which is a separate
and distinct provision.93
Even if the VCDR drafters intended the commercial activity exception to
relate only to those activities for personal profit, Mufti’s employment of
Tabion was still commercial in nature. Moreover, his exploitation of
88. See id. (finding that commercial activity, which is undefined by the VCDR,
should be examined in the context of Article 31(1)(c), referring to when diplomats are
not immune from civil actions, and Article 42, mandating that diplomats are prohibited
from engaging in commercial activity for personal profit).
89. See U.N. Conference, supra note 44, at 10 (distinguishing Article 31(1)(c),
which was Article 29 at the time of negotiations, from Article 42, which was Article 40
bis, because Article 42 refers only to diplomatic agents whereas Article 31(1)(c) also
applies to diplomats’ family members and administrative, technical, and service staff).
90. See VCDR, supra note 8, art. 31(1)(c); see also Tabion, 73 F.3d at 537
(conceding that the exchange between Tabion and Mufti constitutes commercial
activity under the plain meaning because there was an employment contract and a
transaction of goods and services between the two parties); Brief of Appellant Corazon
Tabion at 7-10, Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-1732) (asserting
that defendant’s interpretation of the commercial activity exception is contrary to the
unambiguous plain meaning of the VCDR, which is merely the exchange of goods and
services, including employment contracts).
91. E.g., Brief of Appellant Corazon Tabion at 10, Tabion, 73 F.3d 535 (No. 951732) (citing BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 (1994)) (noting that it
is generally intentional when Congress has included particular language in one section
and omitted it in another section of the same statute).
92. See U.N. Conference, supra note 44, at 14 (stating that the commercial activity
exception to immunity from civil jurisdiction is distinct from the provision prohibiting
diplomatic agents from engaging in professional or commercial activity for personal
profit because the former refers to actions of the diplomats that are subject to the
receiving state’s jurisdiction whereas the latter refers to actions that are prohibited by
diplomats).
93. Compare Tabion, 73 F.3d at 537-38 (narrowing the interpretation of
commercial activity in Article 31(1)(c) to refer only to trade or business activity for
personal profit—and not employment of domestic workers—because Article 42
emphasizes that diplomats are prohibited from engaging in commercial activity for
personal profit), with U.N. Conference, supra note 44, at ¶¶ 1-37, (expressing that the
new article—which ultimately became Article 42—proposed by Colombia that
explicitly prohibited diplomats from engaging in professional and commercial activity
for personal profit was necessary to ensure the public’s trust that diplomats would not
abuse their privileges, which was different from the provision—Article 31(1)(c)—that
noted the exceptions to diplomatic immunity).
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Tabion would have satisfied the “for personal profit” component of the
commercial activity exception.94 By not paying Tabion what was
mandated under federal minimum wage laws, Mufti was essentially
profiting personally from Tabion’s services.95 In other words, Mufti reaped
a profit by retaining the amount of wages that should have been paid to
Tabion as a matter of law.96 Some states even criminalize an employer’s
failure to pay wages as “theft of services.”97
During the twenty-eight months that Tabion worked for Mufti, she
earned approximately $5,600.98 This amount was based on an average
wage of $0.50 per hour for over 400 hours of work per month.99 Under the
federal minimum wage, which was $4.25 per hour during the time the
Muftis employed Tabion, she should have earned at least $47,600.100
Because Mufti paid her only $5,600, he profited at least $42,000 from
94. See VCDR, supra note 8, art. 31(1)(c); Brief of Appellant Corazon Tabion at 5,
Tabion, 73 F.3d 535 (No. 95-1732) (claiming that Mufti only paid Tabion $5,600 over
the course of twenty-eight months, which was equivalent to approximately $0.50 per
hour, rather than the required minimum wage, which was $4.25 per hour during her
employment); see also Report of the Commission, supra note 44, at 56 (discussing the
importance of third parties’ ability to obtain redress from diplomats where there has
been a commercial exchange).
95. See Brief of Appellant Corazon Tabion at 5, Tabion, 73 F.3d 535 (No. 951732); see also Dole v. Bishop, 740 F. Supp. 1221, 1229 (S.D. Miss. 1990)
(determining that it is in the public interest and within the mandate of the FLSA to
require employers to pay back wages into the court’s registry to prevent employers
from profiting from back wages). In Dole, the back wages went to the court’s registry
rather than the employees themselves since the employees presented false testimonies
at trial; had they not presented false testimonies, the employees would have been
entitled to the back wages. Id.
96. See Brief of Appellant Corazon Tabion at 4-5, Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535
(No. 95-1732) (contending that the Muftis breached their employment contract with
Tabion, violated the FLSA, and committed intentional misrepresentations in
employment); Memorandum of Law for the ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Plaintiff at 14, Gonzalez v. Vila, 479 F. Supp. 2d 187 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 06-00089)
(citing Jeremiah v. Richardson, 148 F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1998), Higgins v. Detroit
Educ. Television Found., 4 F. Supp. 2d 701, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1998), among other
cases, to demonstrate that courts have recognized that one profits when retaining the
money that is owed to another).
97. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15 (McKinney 2006). See generally NAT’L
EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, STATE LAWS CREATING CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR
FAILURE TO PAY WAGES 3, 6 (2004), http://www.nelp.org/docUploads/criminal
%20penalties%20for%20unpaid%20 wages%2Epdf [hereinafter NAT’L EMPLOYMENT
LAW PROJECT] (listing Washington, D.C. and California, among other states, as
including a “theft of services” or “theft of labor” provision in their criminal codes,
which subjects the employer to fines and possible imprisonment if they violate the
law).
98. Brief of Appellant Corazon Tabion at 5, Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535 (4th Cir.
1996) (No. 95-1732).
99. Id. at 5-6.
100. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1996) (requiring employers
to pay employees the minimum wage, which has been at least $5.15 per hour since
September 1, 1997). Brief of Appellant Corazon Tabion at 5, Tabion, 73 F.3d 535 (No.
95-1732).
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Tabion’s services.101 Therefore, under Tabion and the State Department’s
interpretation of the VCDR commercial activity exception, which both
require “personal profit” as a component of commercial activity, Mufti’s
failure to comply with the FLSA standards, which resulted in a net profit to
Mufti, was sufficient to fall within the VCDR commercial activity
exception.
3. The Scale and Frequency of the Employment of Domestic Workers
Demonstrates that Such Employment is a Commercial Activity Exception
Under the VCDR
The Tabion court characterized the employment contract between the
diplomat and the domestic worker as the “occasional service contract” and
reasoned that the commercial activity exception was not intended to
include such occasional contracts.102 While there was some discussion in
the negotiation history of the VCDR over the significance of employment
disputes between diplomats and their domestic servants,103 both the
quantity of domestic workers employed by diplomats and the widespread,
abusive violations of the law in this context illustrate that the landscape has
changed in the last half century.104 For example, given the multi-billion
dollar domestic work industry that exists today and the thousands of A-3
and G-5 visas issued each year, it is apparent that these employment
contracts are more than occasional.105 Also, diplomats are permitted to
bring multiple domestic employees to the United States on special visas at
101. See Brief of Appellant Corazon Tabion at 5, Tabion, 73 F.3d 535 (No. 951732).
102. See Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 537 (4th Cir. 1996) (characterizing Tabion’s
interpretation of commercial activity, in which Tabion insisted that her employment
constituted commercial activity because there was an employment contract and a
transaction of goods and services, as superficial and inadequate because the court
considered the commercial activity exception to only pertain to trade or business
activity engaged in for personal profit).
103. See Summary Records of the 402nd Meeting, [1957] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n
95, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1957 (noting cases in which courts found that diplomats
implicitly waived immunity from labor disputes by entering into employment
agreements with domestic servants). In response to whether litigating labor dispute
claims in the courts of the diplomat’s home country was too inconvenient for the
domestic worker, the Special Rapporteur stated that he sympathized with domestic
servants, who he characterized as the “small man,” but opined that the VCDR should
not make too many immunity exceptions based solely on inconvenience. Id.
104. See Libby Lewis, Diplomatic Abuse of Servants Hard to Prosecute (N.P.R.
Mar. 1, 2007), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story
Id=7672967 (noting that the State Department issued 1,957 special temporary visas for
domestic workers of foreign government officials in 2006 and that attorneys are aware
of at least forty cases related to diplomatic abuse of domestic employees).
105. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 9 (providing statistics showing that the
State Department has granted more than 18,500 A-3 visas and at least 11,100 G-5 visas
to domestic workers in the past ten years); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 4
(noting that during the 1990s the government issued over 30,000 A-3 and G-5 visas).
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one time.106 Additionally, many diplomats hire successive employees and
the State Department continues to grant diplomats the privilege of bringing
domestic workers to the United States despite complaints that they have
abused their previous workers.107
Not only is this type of employment relationship common and beyond
the “occasional contract,” organizations have documented the extensive
and widespread problem of diplomats abusing and taking advantage of
domestic workers.108 Evident from the FAM regulations and the Circular
Diplomatic Notes, which mandate diplomats to submit employment
contracts with the visa applications for the domestic workers, the State
Department recognizes the vulnerable conditions that the workers face and
the prevalence of diplomats exploiting them.109
4.Because a Private Individual Can Employ a Domestic Worker and There
is No Meaningful Distinction Between a Diplomat and a Foreign State
Agent that Employs a Domestic Worker, the Broad Interpretation of the
FSIA Commercial Activity Exception Should Apply to the VCDR
Commercial Activity Exception
The FSIA, which was passed two years prior to the Diplomatic Relations
Act that codified the VCDR, though separate and distinct, is similar to the
VCDR in that both include a commercial activity exception that bars the
foreign state and diplomat, respectively, from enjoying immunity
protections based on the relevant statutory terms.110 It is nonetheless
106. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 25.
107. See id. (describing the lack of rigorous enforcement by the U.S. government in

verifying whether diplomats abused previous workers or violated contract provisions
when they issue visas for new domestic employees). For example, in 2000, three
weeks after a Bolivian domestic worker left her employer, an official at the
Organization of American States, the diplomat already had hired a new employee
despite the previous worker’s pending lawsuit against him. Id.
108. See id. at 1 (documenting over forty cases citing employer exploitation of
domestic workers on special temporary work visas); see also Eur. Parl. Ass., Report of
the Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, 18th Sess., Doc. No. 9102
(2001) (noting that a France-based organization, the Committee Against Modern
Slavery, has handled over two hundred domestic slavery cases in which twenty percent
of the employers are diplomats who are shielded by immunity, as opposed to the other
cases where the employers are private individuals that lack immunity protections).
109. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF FOREIGN MISSIONS, CIRCULAR DIPLOMATIC
NOTE ON DOMESTIC EMPLOYEES 1 (May 20, 1996), available at http://www.state.
gov/ofm/31311.htm [hereinafter CIRCULAR DIPLOMATIC NOTE OF MAY 1996]. See
Letter from Brancato, supra note 80, at 3 (quoting a September 24, 1990 letter from the
U.S. State Department Office of the Legal Adviser, which expressed deep concern over
reports of diplomats exploiting their workers, noting that embassies should observe
internationally recognized and statutorily mandated preservation of human rights, and
declared that the State Department will address cases where there is evidence of abuse).
110. Compare Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)
(2006) (noting that courts can exercise jurisdiction over foreign states where the claim
falls within the commercial activity exception) [hereinafter FSIA], with VCDR, supra
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important to note that courts explicitly have recognized the differences
between the VCDR and the FSIA.111 The FSIA is a domestic statute that
governs foreign states, whereas the VCDR is an international treaty that
governs foreign diplomats.112 In contrast to the FSIA delegating the
judiciary authority to determine immunity, courts defer to the State
Department when considering diplomatic status.113 Courts, however,
maintain their authority to determine if an issue is consistent with
congressional intent; thus, because the VCDR commercial activity is
codified by statue, it is within a court’s authority to apply a broader
interpretation of the VCDR commercial activity exception.114
Despite the distinctions between the FSIA and the VCDR, both
authorities share the similar intent to recognize a commercial activity
exception in civil actions rather than absolute immunity from civil
jurisdictions.115 Similar to the FSIA codifying the restrictive immunity
theory such that foreign states are only immune for governmental acts
rather than private, commercial acts, Congress repealed a prior federal law
that granted diplomats complete immunity when it passed the Diplomatic
Relations Act in 1978 because the prior law was inconsistent with the
VCDR.116 By providing a commercial activity exception, Congress
intended both the FSIA and VCDR to allow parties engaging in
commercial activities with foreign states and diplomats, respectively,
note 8, art. 31(1)(c) (providing that diplomatic agents do not enjoy immunity from civil
and administrative jurisdiction where the action relates to a professional or commercial
activity exercised outside of the diplomat’s official functions).
111. See, e.g., Al Mukaddam v. Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia to the United
Nations, 111 F. Supp. 2d 457, 469-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (asserting that the VCDR and
FSIA do not affect one another, such that the VCDR cannot prevent a court from
exercising jurisdiction over a claim that falls under a FSIA exception).
112. Logan v. Dupuis, 990 F. Supp. 26, 30 (D.D.C. 1997).
113. Abdulaziz v. Metro. Dade County, 741 F.2d 1328, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 1984).
114. See, e.g., Traore v. State, 431 A.2d 96, 99 (Md. 1981) (clarifying that
notwithstanding the court’s deference to the State Department on issues of foreign
affairs, the court is still in the position to handle questions of law, including
interpretations of statutes).
115. See FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1603 (declaring that U.S. law on sovereign
immunity should be consistent with international law, such that U.S. courts have
jurisdiction over foreign states if the states partake in commercial activity that has a
substantial impact on the United States); VCDR, supra note 8, art. 31(1)(c) (setting
forth that diplomats are not immune from administrative and civil jurisdiction if they
engage in commercial activities outside their official functions and in the receiving
state); see also Letter from Brancato, supra note 80, at 3 (referring to the restrictive
theory of the FSIA, which provides that sovereign immunity does not apply to
commercial activities, and concluding that diplomats and consular officials acting as
employers in the United States constitutes commercial activity that is subject to
litigation by third parties).
116. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 252-254, repealed by the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978,
22 U.S.C. § 254(a)-(e) (1978) (giving complete immunity to diplomats, including their
domestic employees).
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access to courts.117 Moreover, in considering the purpose of diplomatic
immunity and foreign sovereign immunity in the first instance, the shared
concern of protecting foreign relations in both contexts illustrate that where
there are exceptions to immunity, it is likely that the rationale for the
exceptions would be similar.118 In both contexts, foreign relations,
arguably, could be at risk when courts invoke the commercial activity
exception such that they have jurisdiction over the diplomat or foreign state
agent.119 Nonetheless, Congress decided to make an exception for suits
involving commercial activity that are brought against foreign sovereigns
and diplomats.120 Yet, thus far, courts and the State Department have made
a distinction between the breadth of the commercial activity exception
where courts interpret commercial activity more broadly under the FSIA,
and the narrow conception under the VCDR.121 There does not seem to be
a meaningful explanation as to why, in the context of the FSIA, individual
interests trump foreign relations when it involves any activity in which a
private actor can engage, whereas foreign relations outweigh individual
interests when a diplomat hires and employs a personal domestic
employee.122 As such, the distinction between the broad and narrow
117. See FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (noting that the FSIA commercial activity
exception, which would allow individuals to bring suit against foreign sovereigns when
there has been a commercial exchange in the United States, is intended to “serve the
interests of justice and . . . protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants in
United States courts”); Report of the International Law Commission to the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/3859 (1958), reprinted in [1958] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 98,
104, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1958/Add.1, available at http://untreaty.un.org
/ilc/publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1958_v1_e.pdf (stressing that the
VCDR commercial activity exception is meant to ensure that third parties are not
deprived of their “ordinary remedies” when there has been a commercial relationship
between a diplomat and a third party that is outside the scope of diplomatic function).
118. See, e.g., Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 539 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting the
similarities between sovereign immunity and diplomatic immunity in a discussion of
balancing the interests of the private individual with foreign relation concerns).
119. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606 (explaining that one of the purposes of the FSIA is to
“transfer the determination of sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the
judicial branch . . . to reduce[e] the foreign policy implications of immunity
determinations”).
120. See FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (providing that a foreign state cannot assert
immunity from U.S. courts when the action is based on commercial activity); VCDR,
supra note 8, art. 31(1)(c) (stating that a diplomatic agent does not enjoy immunity
from civil and administrative jurisdiction where he or she has engaged in a commercial
activity outside the realm of his or her diplomatic function).
121. See, e.g., Statement of Interest of the United States at 19-23, Gonzalez v. Vila,
No. 06-0089 (D.D.C. Jan. 26, 2007) (asserting that the case law interpreting the FSIA
commercial activity exception is inappropriate for guiding the interpretation of the
VCDR commercial activity exception because the VCDR is intended to confer broader
immunity privileges than the FSIA).
122. Compare Park v. Shin, 313 F.3d 1138, 1144-45 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding
that employment of a domestic worker falls within the FSIA commercial activity
exception because a private individual can also employ a domestic worker), with
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interpretations of commercial activity under each statute is seemingly
arbitrary.
Rather, courts and the State Department should apply a broader
interpretation of the commercial activity exception of the VCDR.123 A
broader interpretation, similar to that of the FSIA, allows certain
employees—both personal employees and government employees—to
bring suits against foreign state agents in U.S. courts; sovereign immunity
does not apply when the claimant demonstrates that the civil suit based on
labor violations constitutes a commercial activity because foreign state
agents should not be protected for unlawful acts that they commit
regardless of their governmental position.124 In Park, the Ninth Circuit
held that the consular official could not invoke the FSIA because he was
acting outside the scope of his official duties when he hired and supervised
Park, and thus, was not considered a foreign state entitled to immunity
protections.125 The court, nonetheless, went through the commercial
activity analysis of the FSIA, applying the private actor test, to illustrate
that even if the consular official satisfied the foreign state requirement, he
would not have immunity under the FSIA because the activity was
considered commercial.126
The private actor test used by federal courts to determine commercial
activity under the FSIA applies a much broader interpretation of
commercial activity to ensure that private individuals that engage in
transactions with government officials have an opportunity to claim redress
if the government official acts in a manner in which any private individual
can act.127 In El-Hadad v. Embassy of the U.A.E. where El-Hadad, an
Tabion, 73 F.3d at 538-39 (holding that employment of a domestic worker is not within
the VCDR commercial activity exception).
123. See Park, 313 F.3d at 1144-45 (holding that the employment of a domestic
worker is a commercial activity because it is an act that a private actor can engage in,
rather than a public act that only a government can perform); see also Al Mukaddam v.
Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations, 111 F. Supp. 2d 457, 466
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that the Saudi Arabia mission was not immune from suit by a
former employee because hiring someone to perform “research, writing, and clerical
duties” was a commercial activity because a private actor can also engage in such an
act).
124. See Lekopanye Mooketsi, No Diplomatic Immunity in Labour Cases, MMEGI,
Dec. 2, 2005, http://www.mmegi.bw/2005/December/Friday2/454029690697.html
(citing a Botswanan judge, presiding over the Industrial Court, that held that the Libyan
Embassy was not immune from the labor dispute because the complainant, who was a
former employee of the embassy, did not disagree with governmental actions, but
simply claimed wages to which he was entitled). Judge Key Dingake ruled on this case
with the guidance of Botswana’s Attorney General, who expressed that employment is
not an act unique to governments, and therefore immunity should not apply. Id.
125. See Park, 313 F.3d at 1144.
126. See id. at 1144-46.
127. See Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992) (concluding that issuing
bonds is a commercial activity under the FSIA because it is an act that private actors
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internal auditor for the United Arab Emirates embassy, brought suit against
the embassy, the District Court for the District of Columbia found that the
employment of El-Hadad was a commercial act under the FSIA because
conducting audits is a “regular course of commerce” that is not unique to
governments.128 Extending the rationale in analyzing the nature of the
employment relationship between foreign officials and domestic workers, it
is clear that diplomats hiring domestic employees to assist in domestic
work is commercial in nature because private actors can also engage in this
type of contractual relationship.129 Not only is hiring a domestic worker an
action in which any private individual can engage, but a personal domestic
employee mainly assists with the personal needs of the diplomat and his
family within the confines of their home, as opposed to an internal auditor
who works at the embassy and assists with government functions.130
Moreover, hiring someone to cook, clean, and take care of children is “a
regular course of commercial conduct.”131
In contrast to El-Hadad, the Fourth Circuit held in Butters v. Vance
International, Inc. that the FSIA commercial activity exception did not
apply, and therefore a former employee of Vance International, a
corporation that provided security services to businesses and governments,
could not sue the company claiming gender discrimination.132 The court
reasoned that the exception did not apply because it is unique to
governments to decide how to best secure and protect their property and
those who occupy it.133 This case is easily distinguishable from Tabion
because Mufti did not hire Tabion to secure the safety of his home; rather
he hired her to perform household duties—an act that is, without a doubt,
can also perform, as opposed to issuing regulations limiting foreign currency exchange,
which is an activity unique to governments).
128. No. 96-1943, 2006 WL 826098, at *6-7 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2006).
Consequently, the court concluded that the former employee could bring suit against
the embassy because foreign sovereign immunity did not apply. Id.
129. See HOME IS WHERE THE WORK IS, supra note 2, at 11 (discussing that many of
the employers of domestic workers in New York City work in business, finance, law,
healthcare, and other private professions).
130. See Brief of Appellant Corazon Tabion at 5, 15, Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535
(4th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-1732) (emphasizing that Mufti hired Tabion in his personal
capacity, where Tabion never assisted with responsibilities in the embassy, and only
assisted with Mufti and his family’s needs in the home).
131. See FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(d)-(e), 1605(a)(2) (2006).
132. See 225 F.3d 462, 465 (4th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the corporation, Vance
International, could invoke derivative immunity under the FSIA because, as a private
contractor, it is following the Saudi Arabian government’s orders to not promote
Butters, who was the security agent employed by Vance International).
133. See id. (holding that employment of a security agent who is responsible for
protecting the wife of a Saudi King and guarding her residence is governmental in
nature because ensuring the security and safety of a royal family are concerns unique to
sovereign states).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2007

27

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 4

202

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 16:1

commercial in nature since a private actor can also employ a domestic
worker.134
The examples provided by the FSIA legislative history as to what
constitutes commercial activity, and what is an activity peculiar to foreign
sovereigns, also illustrate that there are no ambiguous incidental acts, nor
do the examples fail the private actor test.135 In other words, commercial
activities are either commercial or governmental. Thus, employment of
domestic employees to provide services of cooking, cleaning, and caring
for children should not fall into an incidental gray area considered part of
diplomatic functions; rather, it is apparant that such activities would be
characterized as commercial and outside the scope of diplomatic functions
because private actors can hire people to take on such duties.136
B. Diplomats Should Not Have Immunity From Civil Jurisdiction Because
the Employment of Domestic Workers is Outside Their Official Functions
The VCDR commercial activity exception specifies that the diplomat is
not immune for commercial activities “outside his official functions.”137
This section demonstrates that U.S. laws and regulations, the VCDR, and
the manner in which courts have interpreted employment of domestic
workers under the VCCR and FSIA suggest that domestic work is outside
official functions of the diplomat.
As explained in Background part I, live-in domestic workers often fall
through the gaps of the U.S. legal system because the Department of Labor
(“DOL”) considers their occupation to be work in the private sphere, which
is unregulated by federal labor laws.138 This policy undoubtedly leaves
134. Compare Brief of Appellant Corazon Tabion at 5-6, Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d
535 (No. 95-1732) (stating that Mufti hired Tabion in his personal capacity to assist
with preparing meals and other housekeeping duties in Mufti’s home, but had no such
responsibilities at the Jordanian embassy), with Butters, 225 F.3d at 464-65
(concluding that the Saudi Arabian officials’ refusal of Butters, a female security guard,
to serve in the government’s command post rotation—reasoning that it was contrary to
Islamic law to have male and female officers together for a long duration—was a
decision pertaining to police power, and thus, unique to governments).
135. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 16 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6615 (explaining that employment of civil servants, diplomatic, and military
personnel is governmental in nature because only governments can hire civil servants
and diplomats).
136. See HOME IS WHERE THE WORK IS, supra note 2, at 11 (finding that over half of
the employers of domestic workers are private individuals who work as corporate
executives, business owners, accountants, lawyers, doctors, reporters, and other
professions); see also Young, supra note 19, at 20 (asserting that as long as there is an
employment relationship, domestic workers should have the same legal protections as
other workers, such as safe and healthful working conditions under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, because tasks such as cleaning and cooking can be performed
anywhere).
137. See VCDR, supra note 8, art. 31(1)(c).
138. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(21) (2004) (excluding
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domestic workers unprotected and in a weaker bargaining position than
their employers.139 Nonetheless, if applying the DOL rationale that
domestic work is in the private sphere such that a “true employment
relationship” does not exist, then the relationship between diplomats and
domestic workers who cook, clean, and take care of children would be of a
personal nature.140 Under this rationale, it would seem that the relationship
between diplomats and domestic workers would be considered an activity
outside the scope of their official duties.141
Nonetheless, the Tabion court asserted that the services provided by the
domestic worker were incidental to the diplomat’s daily life and not
intended to be considered outside of a diplomat’s official functions.142 The
court, however, provided no justification for this statement nor did it
address Tabion’s argument that the diplomat’s assertion produces
unrealistic demands on third parties who assist the diplomat in daily
services.143 To the contrary, these “incidentals to daily life” personally
benefit the employer and not the sending state.144
1. U.S. Laws and Regulations and the VCDR Illustrate that the
Employment of Domestic Workers Is Outside Diplomatic Functions
By definition, as elucidated in Article 1(h) of the VCDR, a “‘private
servant’ is a person who is in the domestic service of a member of the
mission and who is not an employee of the sending [s]tate.”145 Moreover,
the FAM defines an A-3 visa holder as a “personal employee” of the
diplomat.146 The Diplomatic Circular Notes also emphasize that A-3
time and a half overtime pay for workweeks that are over forty hours if domestic
employees reside in the employer’s home).
139. See GLOBAL RIGHTS ET AL., supra note 22, at 10.
140. See Young, supra note 19, at 67 (noting that some argue that the home—the
private sphere—should not be regulated by the government).
141. Cf. Park v. Shin, 313 F.3d 1138, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 2002).
142. See Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 539 n.9 (4th Cir. 1996) (contending that a
decision to include domestic worker employment in the VCDR commercial activity
exception would prompt foreign courts to follow the same conclusion, and
subsequently put U.S. diplomats located overseas at risk for having to appear in foreign
courts).
143. See Brief of Appellant Corazon Tabion at 11-12, Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535
(4th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-1732) (arguing that a decision to include domestic worker
employment in the commercial activity exception would generate unrealistic demands
on commercial service providers because merchants would have to inquire whether
they are dealing with diplomats to protect themselves from situations where their
customers refuse to pay for the contracted services).
144. See Tabion, 73 F.3d at 536.
145. VCDR, supra note 8, art. 1(h) (emphasis added in text). On the other hand,
another provision of the VCDR defines a member of the service staff as a person that is
in domestic service of the mission itself, as opposed to a member of the mission. Id. at
art. 1(g).
146. Compare 9 F.A.M. § 41.22 n.4 (2001) (designating A-3 visas to personal
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employees are personal household employees of the diplomat and not
employees of the mission.147 By defining the domestic worker as a
personal employee of the diplomat in the various authorities discussed
above and characterizing the relationship between a domestic worker and a
foreign government official as one that is a “true employee and/or
employer relationship,” it seems unambiguous that the employment of a
personal employee is outside of the diplomat’s official activities.148
Congress’s enactment of the Diplomatic Relations Act to codify the
VCDR provides further evidence that a domestic employee of the diplomat
is not considered part of the diplomat’s official functions.149 The
Diplomatic Relations Act repealed a 1790 statute that had granted private
servants of diplomats immunity from criminal and civil jurisdiction.150 By
affirmatively taking away immunity privileges from domestic employees
so that U.S. law would be consistent with international law on diplomatic
immunity, it is clear that the work of domestic employees does not support
the official functions of diplomats; otherwise, domestic employees would
be afforded some level of immunity protections to help them carry out their
functions.151
The fact that the services provided by a private domestic employee are
outside diplomatic functions is demonstrated further in the FAM where the
State Department sets forth different levels of immunity privileges to the
varying grades of diplomatic positions and does not afford any immunity
privileges to private domestic employees.152 The FAM recognizes that
employees of A-1 or A-2 visa holders), with 9 F.A.M. § 41.22 n.2.1 (1988) (providing
A-2 visas for employees of diplomatic missions or consular posts).
147. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF FOREIGN MISSIONS, CIRCULAR DIPLOMATIC
NOTE ON DOMESTIC EMPLOYEES (May 20, 1996), available at http://www.state.gov
/ofm/31311.htm (emphasizing that the United States will hold a mission and sending
government responsible where its diplomats have abused their personal employees
even though personal servants work for diplomats and not the mission).
148. See 9 F.A.M. § 41.22 n.4.3 (2001) (suggesting that the employer inquire
whether the A-3 applicant is capable of performing the work duties such that the
government official and domestic employee would be entering into a “true employee
and/or employer relationship” governed by U.S. laws).
149. Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. § 254(a)-(e) (1978).
150. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 252-254, repealed by the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978,
22 U.S.C. § 254(a)-(e) (1978) (abolishing an English immunity statute from 1790 under
the rule of Queen Anne, which granted complete criminal and civil immunity for
diplomats, family members of diplomats, diplomatic staff, and private servants,
including U.S. citizens and permanent residents).
151. See Diplomatic Immunity and U.S. Interests: Statement on H.R. 3036 Before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 100th Cong. 17 (1987) (statement of
Ambassador Selwa Roosevelt, Chief of Protocol of the United States).
152. See 2 F.A.M. § 232.1 (1991) (denoting that diplomatic agents have the highest
level of privileges with complete immunity from criminal jurisdiction and some
immunity from civil jurisdiction; that members of administrative and technical staff
have the same privileges as diplomatic agents except that they are not immune from
civil actions conducted outside official duties; and that members of service staff only
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members of the administrative and technical staff handle internal matters
that are pertinent to the functions of the mission, and consequently accords
them similar immunity privileges as that of diplomatic agents except that
immunity from civil claims only apply in actions conducted in the course
of official duties.153 It also acknowledges that members of the service staff
of diplomatic missions carry out basic responsibilities that support the
mission and accords them immunity for acts conducted during these
official duties.154 Applying the Fourth Circuit’s characterization of
Tabion’s services as incidental to the daily life of the diplomat, one could
argue that the basic support tasks of service staff, who are “in the domestic
service of the mission,” are also incidental to the mission.155 Nonetheless,
the FAM, echoing the VCDR, explicitly carves out a category of privileges
to which the service staff are entitled to because of their official duties; in
contrast, the State Department does not articulate any immunity protections
for private domestic employees, but denotes domestic workers of diplomats
as “personal household employees . . . of the mission member and not of
the mission.”156 Consequently, without any immunity protections, it can be
inferred that domestic employees of diplomats are not part of the official
functions of the mission; thus, a diplomat’s employment of a domestic
worker is outside diplomatic functions.157

have criminal and civil immunity for official acts).
153. See 2 F.A.M. § 232.1-2 (1991); VCDR, supra note 8, art. 1(f) (defining
members of the administrative and technical staff as “the members of the staff of the
mission employed in the administrative and technical service of the mission”).
154. See 2 F.A.M. § 232.1-3 (1991) (providing that members of service staff have
immunity from both civil and criminal jurisdiction in so far as the acts are performed in
their official capacity, but that they do not benefit from personal inviolability or
immunity from being a witness); VCDR, supra note 8, art. 1(g) (explaining that
members of service staff are “members of the staff of the mission in the domestic
service of the mission”).
155. See Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 538-39 (4th Cir. 1996) (articulating that
diplomats are immune to actions related to activities, such as paying for dry cleaning
service or domestic help, because they are incidental to a diplomat’s daily life and not
outside diplomatic functions).
156. Compare 2 F.A.M. § 232.1-3 (1991) (setting forth that service staff of missions
have some immunity protections, but far less than diplomatic agents or administrative
and technical staff because they only perform menial tasks), with U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
OFFICE OF FOREIGN MISSIONS, CIRCULAR DIPLOMATIC NOTE ON DOMESTIC EMPLOYEES
3, 5 (May 20, 1996), available at http://www.state .gov/ofm/31311.htm (articulating
that the diplomats’ personal domestic employees are not employees of the mission, and
that the State Department may deny diplomats’ applications to bring personal servants
to the United States when diplomats violate such privileges).
157. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY AND
PRIVILEGES (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization
/20047.pdf.
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2. Based on the Nature of the Duties of Domestic Workers and the
Structure of the Employment Relationship, Employment of Domestic
Workers is Not a Core Function of Diplomats and Consular Officers
In Park v. Shin, the Ninth Circuit properly concluded that Shin’s
employment of Park, his domestic employee, was not considered within the
scope of a legitimate consular function under the VCCR.158 The Ninth
Circuit’s analysis to determine whether Park could sue her employer is
relevant because the court goes beyond the Fourth Circuit’s unsupported
argument that Tabion’s employment was within the scope of diplomatic
functions because her services were “incidental to daily life.”159 It is clear
from the varying degrees of immunity privileges and from the articulated
functions of consular officials and diplomats that the scope of official
functions of consular officials differs from that of diplomats.160
Nonetheless, because the nature of domestic work does not depend on the
position of the employer—for example, whether the employer is a diplomat
or consular officer—there are several factors that indicate that employment
of domestic workers is outside the context of both the official functions of
diplomats and consular officials, such that domestic workers should have
the opportunity to adjudicate claims against their employers.161
First, one must decide, in both the context of consular officers and
diplomats, what functions are official when determining whether immunity
privileges apply to the government official.162 One of the main purposes of
having diplomatic missions and consular officers present in the receiving
state is for the sending state to protect its citizens living in the destination

158. See 313 F.3d 1138, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002).
159. See id. at 1142-43 (considering several factors, such as the domestic worker’s

type of employment visa and whether Park was paid out of the consular officer’s
personal funds, to determine that Shin employed Park as a personal employee, outside
of consular functions).
160. Compare VCCR, supra note 51, art. 5 (listing various functions of consular
officers, some of which overlap with diplomatic functions, and some of which, such as
issuing passports, are specific to consulates), and VCCR, supra note 51, art. 43
(specifying that immunity privileges only apply to acts conducted in the exercise of
consular functions), with VCDR, supra note 8, art. 3 (articulating that diplomatic
missions are responsible for representing the sending state in the host state and
negotiating with the host state’s government, which are functions not listed in the
VCCR), and VCDR, supra note 8, art. 31(1) (setting forth that diplomats have
complete immunity from criminal jurisdiction regardless of whether the act in question
is conducted in the performance of diplomatic functions, as opposed to consular
officers who only have immunity for official acts).
161. See Park, 313 F.3d at 1142-43.
162. See VCDR, supra note 8, art. 3(1) (permitting courts to have civil jurisdiction
over actions where diplomats have engaged in a professional or commercial activity
outside official functions) (emphasis added); VCCR, supra note 51, art. 43
(highlighting that consular officers have immunity only to the extent that the actions at
issue are performed within their official functions) (emphasis added).
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country.163 International organizations such as the International Labor
Organization and the UN have stated explicitly the significant role of
embassies and consulates in protecting domestic workers from abuse.164
Thus, because it is within a diplomat’s official functions to protect
domestic workers, it follows that exploiting domestic workers would be
considered outside diplomatic functions.165 Even in instances where the
diplomat and domestic worker are from different countries, it is not only
outside of the diplomat’s official functions to exploit and abuse its workers,
but also to employ domestic workers in the first instance.
Second, in both the context of a consular officer and of a diplomat, one
must determine if the individual acted within the scope of his or her official
functions when they performed the particular act in question.166 Similar to
the assertion above that employment of personal domestic employees is not
part of diplomatic functions, otherwise the workers themselves would be
afforded immunity privileges, the Ninth Circuit rejected Shin’s argument
that hiring and supervising Park was essential to Shin’s performance of his
consular functions.167 Even though Park’s services allowed Shin more time
to tend to consular matters, the court appropriately considered it an indirect
benefit and insufficient to justify Park’s employment as a consular
function.168 Given the similarities in the structure of the employment
relationship between domestic workers and their employers—whether
diplomats or consular officers—and the nature of domestic work, the Ninth
Circuit’s rationale that employment of private domestic employees is
outside consular functions should apply to diplomats who employ domestic
workers, such that domestic workers’ services are an indirect benefit, if
any, to the mission and do not constitute diplomatic functions.169
163. See VCDR, supra note 8, art. 3(1) (providing that diplomatic functions include
protecting the sending state’s nationals, representing the sending state’s interests,
negotiating with the receiving state, monitoring developments in the sending state, and
promoting diplomatic relations between the states); VCCR, supra note 51, art. 5 (listing
thirteen consular functions, two of which include protecting, assisting, and representing
the interests of nationals from sending states).
164. See Int’l Labour Org., Protection of Migrant Domestic Workers in Destination
Countries, at 26 (Mar. 1, 2006) [hereinafter ILO] (discussing the responsibility of
foreign service officers under the VCDR and VCCR to protect its nationals in the
receiving state, particularly in light of the increasing migrant domestic workforce); The
Special Rapporteur, supra note 30, ¶ 87 (recommending that consulates provide shelter
and legal assistance to domestic workers escaping abusive employers, and mediate
between parties where legal recourse is implausible).
165. See Brief of Appellant Corazon Tabion at 5, Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535 (4th
Cir. 1996) (No. 95-1732).
166. See VCDR, supra note 8, art. 3(1)(c); 2 F.A.M. § 232.2 (1991).
167. See Park v. Shin, 313 F.3d 1138, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002).
168. See id.
169. See Brief of Appellant Corazon Tabion at 15, Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535
(No. 95-1732) (asserting that Tabion only provided services that benefited Mufti and
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Third, domestic workers of consular officers and diplomats often are
employed as their personal employees and not employees of the consulates
or embassies.170 In contrast to the Fourth Circuit’s articulation that the
domestic worker’s services of cooking and cleaning were incidental to
daily life and within the scope of the diplomat’s official functions, the
Ninth Circuit accurately characterized the domestic worker’s services as
personally benefiting the consular officer and his family, and that any
services to the consulate were incidental to her job as a personal
employee.171 The Ninth Circuit considered several elements that should
apply to domestic workers employed by diplomats to determine the scope
of their employment.172 First, it compared the different types of visas
available to employees of foreign government officials to demonstrate the
delineation between personal employees and employees of consulates, or
embassies.173 It reasoned that if Shin’s employment of Park was within the
scope of his consular functions, then Park would have been employed on an
A-2 visa designated for employees of consulates or diplomatic missions,
and not an A-3 visa designated for the personal employees of consular
officers.174 Applying this rationale to diplomats who employ domestic
workers, it is clear that domestic workers are personal employees, so the
employment of domestic workers is outside the scope of diplomatic
functions; otherwise, domestic workers would be employed and brought to
the United States on A-2 visas rather than A-3 visas.175 One might argue
his family and she never assisted in any diplomatic events).
170. See Park, 313 F.3d at 1142-43 (stating that Park had an A-3 visa, which is
reserved for personal employees of consular officers and diplomats); Brief of Appellant
Corazon Tabion at 5 n.3, Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535 (No. 95-1732) (noting that
Mufti obtained an A-3 visa for Tabion, so that she could work in the United States
exclusively as Mufti’s personal employee).
171. Cf. VCCR, supra note 51, art. 1(i) (defining private staff as someone “who is
employed exclusively in the private service of a member of a consular post”).
Compare Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 538-39 (4th Cir. 1996) (asserting that
providing dry cleaning service to diplomats or assisting with laundry are incidental to
daily life, so diplomats should be immune from legal actions that arise from such
occurrences), with Park, 313 F.3d at 1142-43 (concluding that Park was a personal
employee for the Shins because the majority of her time was spent caring for the Shins’
children and engaging in other household duties, rather than assisting with a few
consulate dinner events held at the Shins’ home).
172. Park, 313 F.3d at 1143.
173. See id. (comparing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(A)(iii) (2006), which reserves A-3
visas for personal employees of foreign government officials, with 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(15)(A)(ii) (2006), which specifies that employees of consulates or diplomatic
missions should obtain A-2 visas, and observing that “PERSONAL EMPLOYEE OF
MR. SHIN” appeared on Park’s visa).
174. See id. at 1145 (rejecting Shin’s argument that foreign sovereign immunity
under FSIA should apply because only a government official can obtain an A-3 visa,
and explaining that a private foreign national can just as likely employ a domestic
employee under the B-1 visa).
175. See Brief of Appellant Corazon Tabion at 6, 5 n.3, Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d
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that the existence of special temporary work visas designated for domestic
employees of diplomats indicates that domestic employees were
contemplated as part of diplomatic functions; this, however, is not the
premise behind the special visa category, which extends to diplomats as a
matter of custom and courtesy.176
The Ninth Circuit also looked to the fact that the Shins paid Park from
their personal funds and that the majority of Park’s workday entailed
services that catered towards the Shins themselves.177 Although there is no
information in the record regarding the source of Tabion’s salary, it is
evident that Tabion was a personal employee of the Muftis, particularly
because she never performed any services for the Jordanian embassy unlike
Park, who assisted with some consular events held at the Shins’ home.178
Thus, based on the above factors, the manner in which courts and the State
Department characterize the services of domestic workers as “incidental to
daily life” and within the scope of a diplomat’s official functions is
unsound; rather, employment of a personal domestic employee should be
considered outside diplomatic functions.
3. The Employment of Domestic Workers is Outside Diplomatic Functions
Because the Official is Acting as an Individual, the Action Brought Against
the Official is Targeted at Him and Not the State, and the Action Does Not
Interfere with the Sovereignty of the Foreign State
In Park v. Shin, the Ninth Circuit articulated several factors to determine
whether foreign agents are acting within the scope of their official duties
535 (4th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-1732) (explaining how Mufti employed Tabion as a
domestic employee in his home in Jordan, and then brought Tabion on an A-3 visa to
the United States after his appointment as the First Secretary of the Jordanian
Embassy); see also VCDR, supra note 8, art. 1(h) (clarifying that a domestic worker is
the personal employee of a member of the diplomatic mission and “not an employee of
the sending state”).
176. See Lewis, supra note 104 (citing John Miller, a recently retired State
Department official who dealt with human trafficking issues, and who claims that
eliminating the special visa program, which he considers to serve no purpose, would
put an end to the problem of diplomatic immunity because diplomats would then have
to hire Americans as their domestic workers); cf. Summary Records of the 407th
Meeting, [1957] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 122, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1957
(explaining that it was the practice, though not a rule, that the personal effects of the
diplomatic agent—including private servants brought with him from the sending
country—should be exempt from taxation). It should be noted, however, that this
recommendation and assumption that diplomats would hire U.S. citizens as domestic
workers oversimplifies the complexity of the problem; removing the special visas does
not necessarily imply that diplomats would employ U.S. citizens as their personal
servants, nor would it resolve the problem of diplomats abusing their employees or
address the immunity issues that arise when employees, regardless of their citizenship,
attempt to vindicate their rights. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 1-3.
177. Park, 313 F.3d at 1143.
178. See Brief of Appellant Corazon Tabion at 5-6, Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535
(4th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-1732).
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under the FSIA.179 The court’s analysis, which looked to whether the
officer was acting as an individual and not as an official, if the action
against the officer was in reality targeted at the officer’s state, and if the
action taken against the officer would interfere with the sovereignty of the
foreign state, was more nuanced than the Fourth Circuit’s unsupported
articulation that “day-to-day living services . . . were not meant to be
treated as outside a diplomat’s official functions.”180 The Park court found
that Shin was acting in his individual capacity when he hired Park as a
personal family employee, paid her with personal funds, and most of her
work benefited the family and not the consulate.181 Extending the Park
rationale to a relationship between a diplomatic agent and domestic worker,
such as between Mufti and Tabion, one could clearly find that a diplomat is
acting outside the scope of his duties when he employs a domestic worker
as his personal employee, where she cooks, cleans, and engages in other
activities that personally benefit the family of the diplomat.182
The Park court’s determination that Shin’s claims were not disguised as
actions taken against the foreign state because she objected to Shin’s
personal decisions regarding her wages and working conditions rather than
his government policy decisions also applies to many domestic worker
claims against diplomats.183 Using the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that a
judgment against Shin would not interfere with the sovereignty of Korea, it
is clear that allowing domestic workers to adjudicate claims against
diplomats would similarly not interfere with diplomatic relations because
the lawsuits are targeted at diplomats’ personal decisions and not the
decisions of the mission.184 Taking all these factors into consideration, it is
179. 313 F.3d at 1144.
180. Id. at 1142-44 (examining whether the action against the foreign official is

masked as a claim against the state and whether allowing the action to proceed would
impact state sovereignty to determine if Shin acted within his official functions in
employing Park).
181. Id. at 1143-44.
182. See Brief of Appellant Corazon Tabion at 6, Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535 (No.
95-1732) (describing that Mufti’s family hired Tabion in their personal capacity, that
Tabion only catered towards their personal needs, and at no time worked at the
Jordanian embassy).
183. Compare Park, 313 F.3d at 1141, 1144 (holding that Shin could not invoke
foreign sovereign immunity with regards to Park’s allegations that he failed to pay her
the minimum wage and provide her proper medical treatment because Park’s claims
pertained to Shin’s personal decisions and not government policy), with Complaint at
¶¶ 9-19, Gonzalez Paredes v. Vila, 479 F. Supp. 2d 187 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 06-00089)
(claiming that the diplomats breached the employment contract, which stipulated that
Gonzalez, an A-3 domestic employee, would earn $6.72 per hour for forty hours per
week and receive overtime wages for work exceeding the forty hours). Instead, for an
average of seventy-seven hours of work per week, the diplomat only paid her a
monthly wage of $500, which is roughly $1.60 per hour. Id.
184. See, e.g., Mooketsi, supra note 124 (citing a Botswanan judge who reasoned
that a former employee of the Libyan Embassy bringing suit against the Embassy for
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clear that employment of domestic workers is not within the scope of a
government agent’s official duties under the FSIA, nor is it within the
scope of diplomatic functions.
Moreover, in situations where the diplomatic employer commits
egregious violations of law, such as trafficking or involuntary servitude,
these actions cannot be considered within the scope of his official duties.185
Even where the employment relationship between the diplomat and
domestic worker would be deemed as part of the diplomat’s official
functions, the diplomat’s disrespect for the receiving state’s laws are
undiplomatic and contrary to the VCDR and the policies of the State
Department.186
Integrating the analysis from Analysis parts I.A and I.B, it is clear that
the diplomat-domestic worker employment relationship constitutes
commercial activity outside the diplomat’s official functions pursuant to
the VCDR. As the earlier analysis demonstrates, commercial activity does
not necessarily require that the diplomat gain a personal profit, although a
diplomat who pays his domestic employee below minimum wage arguably
gains a personal profit. Furthermore, the VCDR did not anticipate the
egregious exploitation of domestic workers nor did it intend to deprive
domestic workers of their remedies. Employment of a domestic worker
also is considered a commercial activity under the FSIA private actor
test.187 Finally, hiring and supervising a domestic employee is outside the
diplomat’s official functions, and employment of domestic workers is a
common practice among the diplomatic community.
C. An Alternative Interpretation of the VCDR or a Request to Waive
Immunity From the Sending State is Consistent with U.S. Laws and Will
Not Undermine Diplomatic Relations
The State Department regulations specific to the diplomat-domestic
worker employment relationship, and the general FAM regulations
governing the scope of immunity privileges demonstrate that the State
Department has a duty—and the authority—to request waivers of immunity
from sending states or to apply an alternative interpretation of the VCDR
his wages was not invoking diplomatic issues but claiming his entitled compensation).
185. See In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 497-98 (9th Cir.
1992) (concluding that Imee Marcos-Manotoc, the daughter of Ferdinand Marcos, a
former Philippine President, was acting outside the scope of her official duties under
the FSIA, when she ordered police and military intelligence to torture a student to death
because the student disagreed with her politics).
186. See VCDR, supra note 8, preamble; 2 F.A.M. § 233.2 (1991).
187. See Park, 313 F.3d at 1145 (explaining that courts are required under the FSIA
to examine the nature of the governmental entities’ actions, not the purpose, and if the
act does not require performance by a state actor it qualifies as commercial).
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commercial activity exception to protect the rights of domestic workers and
ensure that diplomats are not abusing their privileges.188 Recently, the
State Department requested on behalf of three domestic workers—who
were trafficked into the United States by a Kuwaiti diplomat—a waiver of
immunity from the government of Kuwait to prosecute the diplomat.189
When the Kuwaiti government refused, the State Department forced Mr.
XX to leave his post at the Kuwaiti embassy in Washington, D.C.190 While
the State Department’s actions on behalf of these three domestic servants
are a step forward, its practices generally are inconsistent with the FAM
regulations, and the current legal mechanisms governing the employment
of domestic workers are not strong enough.
This raises the question of why the State Department does not follow its
own policies as articulated in the FAM. The State Department justifies its
lack of intervention in these cases by contending that there are reciprocity
concerns at play; because a receiving state also acts as a sending state in
another country, diplomatic immunity is meant to protect U.S. officials that
are living and working abroad.191 While it is true that there are U.S.
diplomats stationed in countries where they might not have the same due
process protections as they have in the United States, this justification,
however, does not explain why including employment contracts of
domestic employees in the FSIA commercial activity exception—when the
acts of a foreign agent are at issue—does not interfere with foreign
relations.192
Similarly, how does characterizing domestic worker
employment outside consular functions such that employees can sue
consular officers affect relations between consulates and the countries that
they represent?193 The fact that courts interpret the FSIA and VCCR in a
manner that allows employees to adjudicate their claims against foreign
government officials indicates that the alternative interpretation of the
VCDR commercial activity exception or a request to the sending state to
188. See 2 F.A.M. §§ 233.2, 233.3, 234.2 (1991) (recognizing the State
Department’s own responsibility in protecting the public from diplomats that abuse
their immunity privileges, such that it will respond immediately to reports of abuse by
requesting a waiver of immunity from the sending state or requiring offenders to leave
the country).
189. See Lewis, supra note 26.
190. See id.
191. See, e.g., Diplomatic Immunity and U.S. Interests: Statement on H.R. 3036
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 100th Cong. 8 (1987) (statement of
Ambassador Selwa Roosevelt, Chief of Protocol of the United States) (indicating that
legislation limiting diplomatic immunity would subject U.S. diplomats living abroad to
indefinite detention if arrested in a country that lacked due process protections).
192. See Segni v. Commercial Office of Spain, 835 F.2d 160, 165 (7th Cir. 1987).
193. See Park v. Shin, 313 F.3d 1138, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that
Park’s suit would not interfere with consular relations because the suit was against the
consular officer and not targeted against the state).
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waive immunity will not undermine diplomatic relations.
There are several reasons why the alternative interpretation of the VCDR
commercial activity exception, to include employment of domestic workers
or a request to waive immunity from the sending state, will not affect
reciprocity or functional necessity in a manner that is detrimental to U.S.
officials working in another country or the diplomatic system. First, as
discussed above, adjudicating the claims of domestic workers does not rise
to the level of interfering with diplomatic affairs, particularly compared to
issues such as espionage and terrorist activities, which are targeted acts
towards a country.194 The claims brought by domestic workers against
diplomats are legal in nature and not political.195 In other words, the
worker bringing the case is not criticizing the diplomat for one’s policy
choices nor is the State Department when it requests a waiver of
immunity.196 This was illustrated in both Tabion and Park, where the
causes of actions brought against the employers targeted the government
official’s personal decisions governing the employment relationship and
did not aim at impacting the diplomatic relations between the receiving and
sending states.197 The Park court explained that a judgment against the
consular official would not impact Korea’s sovereignty or “policy-making
power.”198
Even in Segni v. Commercial Office of Spain, where a government
employee, as opposed to a personal domestic employee, filed suit against
the Spanish government for breach of contract, the Seventh Circuit
reasoned that the government could not invoke foreign sovereign immunity
under the FSIA because the nature of his employment was commercial
194. See, e.g., John Greenwald, Showdown on Embassy Row, TIME, July 27, 1987, at
46 (describing a dispute between the French and Iranian embassies, which was
triggered by Iran’s refusal to allow France to interrogate a suspected Iranian terrorist
who took refuge in the Iranian embassy in Paris); Michael S. Serrill, Moscow Takes a
Hostage, TIME, Sept. 15, 1986, at 22 (explaining how officers of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation arrested a suspected Soviet diplomat for espionage, and that one week
later, the Soviet Union retaliated by detaining a U.S. reporter in Moscow).
195. See Sangeetha Mugunthan, Diplomatic Immunity in the Context of
International Human Rights, LEGAL SERVICE INDIA.COM, http://www.legalservice
india.com/ articles/dhuman.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2005) (describing two broad
categories of abuse of diplomatic immunity—one which is of “terrorist or political
nature,” and the other is of “a more personal nature”); see also Eur. Parl. Ass.,
Recommendation on Domestic Slavery, 18th Sess., Doc. No. 1523 (2001)
(recommending that states amend the VCDR so that it includes a waiver of immunity
for “offen[s]es committed in private life”).
196. E.g., David A. Jones, Jr., Diplomatic Immunity: Recent Developments in Law
and Practice, 85 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 261, 266 (1991) (explaining, as the State
Department’s Office of the Legal Adviser, that many cases, such as traffic violations
and real property disputes, are not political in character and do not affect diplomatic
functions).
197. See Park, 313 F.3d at 1144; Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 536 (4th Cir. 1996).
198. Park, 313 F.3d at 1144.
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despite his duty to help facilitate government policy.199 While the Park and
Segni courts analyzed the cases in the context of consular and foreign
sovereign immunity, respectively, similar reasoning has been advanced to
explain why the VCDR provides exceptions to diplomatic immunity from
civil jurisdiction.200 In 2005, a judge of the Industrial Court in Botswana
ruled that the Libyan Embassy’s employment of a translator was a private
act that the VCDR immunity privileges did not cover.201 The judge
reasoned that claimants should be permitted to bring labor disputes because
they were simply claiming their rights to their earned wages and not
antagonizing the government or attempting to “assault [its] dignity.”202
Applying this rationale to Tabion and other domestic workers employed by
diplomats, it is evident that U.S. courts should interpret employment
contracts as a commercial activity under the VCDR because adjudication of
such claims would not interfere with diplomatic relations.203 Though one
could argue that disputes between diplomats and domestic workers from
the same sending state are internal matters that would be better dealt with
by the courts of the sending state, the VCDR negotiation history noted the
inconvenience and absurdity of having two parties located in the receiving
state to have to litigate their claims in a different country.204
Moreover, in comparison to criminal accountability, some consider that
civil liability interferes less with diplomatic relations because incarceration
is not at issue.205 Because the VCDR provides for a commercial activity
exception with respect to immunity for civil jurisdiction, some argue that
private claims against the diplomat involving commercial activity are
permitted because the receiving states’ interests outweigh the sending
states’ interests and the risks of interfering with diplomatic functions are
minimal.206 Nonetheless, it should also be stressed that the U.S.
199. See 835 F.2d 160, 165 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that the Spanish government’s
employment of Segni, who was hired to market Spanish wines, was commercial in
nature because his job was only to promote government policies, not create them).
200. See Mooketsi, supra note 124 (reporting on a Botswanan judge’s decision
holding that diplomats are not immune from labor disputes because, as a functional
matter, a lawsuit claiming wages withheld would not interfere with diplomatic
functions).
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See Letter from Brancato, supra note 80, at 3 (expressing in a State Department
telegram to a U.S. mission abroad that employees of diplomatic or consular missions
can sue their employers if their employment terms have been violated because their
employment is generally considered commercial activity).
204. Report of the Commission, supra note 44, at 56.
205. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 95-958, at 4 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1940 (pressing local jurisdictions to shift parking ordinances contained in the local
criminal code to the civil code).
206. See Jones, Jr., supra note 196, at 266 (providing, as the State Department
Office of the Legal Adviser, traffic violations and real property disputes as examples of
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government should have as much of an interest in requesting waivers of
immunity from sending states to prosecute diplomats that have committed
trafficking, servitude, forced labor, and other egregious crimes as it does
for civil actions.207
II. MECHANISMS THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT SHOULD IMPLEMENT TO
PROTECT THE RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF DOMESTIC WORKERS THAT DO
NOT UNDERMINE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
In so far as diplomatic functions are at issue, there are practical vehicles
available that are consistent with existing law to buttress an alternative
interpretation of the VCDR’s commercial activity exception and ensure that
including employment of domestic workers as an activity that is
unprotected by diplomatic immunity, or a request to waive immunity in this
context, does not interfere with diplomatic relations.
A.The State Department Should Strengthen Bilateral and Regional
Agreements to Ensure that the Parties to the Treaties Clearly Understand
that Diplomats Can be Sued for Abusing Their Domestic Workers
Adjudicating domestic worker claims will not provoke reciprocity issues
because the United States has mechanisms in place to ensure that U.S.
officials working abroad are treated fairly.208 When Congress enacted the
Diplomatic Relations Act to codify the VCDR, it included a provision that
authorizes the President to extend more or less favorable treatment than
what is provided for in the VCDR to diplomatic missions.209 In addition,
the VCDR explicitly states in Article 47(2)(b) that states can enter into
separate agreements that deviate from the international treaty.210 With
cases that “carry no political baggage” meaning that waiving immunity for such actions
would not interfere with diplomatic functions).
207. See Lewis, supra note 104 (discussing how an immigration lawyer reported
fifteen cases of diplomats abusing personal servants to the State Department, but none
of the diplomats in those cases have been prosecuted). The U.S. government, however,
recognized nine of the domestic workers as human trafficking victims, which means
that they are allowed to remain in the United States on a T-visa and qualify for welfare
assistance. Id.
208. See Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. § 254(c) (2007) (giving the
President authority to deviate from the VCDR such that the United States and other
countries may choose to grant more extensive or restrictive immunity privileges to one
another).
209. Id.
210. E.g., Agreement between the United States and Canada Concerning the
Privileges and Immunities of Members of the Administrative and Technical Staffs of
the Embassy of Canada in the United States and the Embassy of the United States in
Canada, U.S.-Can., Sept. 22, 1993, State Dep’t No. 94-18, 1993 WL 590469 (agreeing
to extend the immunity protections of the VCDR, including complete criminal
immunity and immunity from civil jurisdiction even for acts conducted in their
unofficial capacity unless it is commercial in nature, to members of the administrative
and technical staff and their families); see VCDR, supra note 8, art. 47(2)(b) (providing
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many countries and international organizations recognizing that diplomats
are exploiting their workers with impunity, thus, creating an urgent need to
address the issue,211 the U.S. government should exercise its authority by
entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements with other countries to
adopt a broader interpretation of the VCDR commercial activity exception
that includes employment of domestic workers.212
Bilateral treaties are particularly effective when the agreements are made
with countries that have similar due process protections as the United
States, such as Canada and the United Kingdom.213 Thus, by using bilateral
agreements or regional agreements, the State Department could negotiate a
policy with countries that have similar due process protections such that
foreign government officials who violate U.S. laws governing labor,
trafficking, abuse, false imprisonment, and other relevant areas of law
would prompt the State Department to request a waiver of immunity.214
With an explicit waiver from the sending state regarding adjudication of
claims against the diplomat, reciprocity would not be at issue because
signing states would clearly understand that immunity privileges would not
extend to the issue of treatment of domestic workers.215
Furthermore, bilateral and regional agreements formalizing a waiver of
immunity in this context would enhance diplomatic relations as opposed to
exacerbating the tension between competing state interests.216 Thus, by
that a country will not be considered as discriminating against another, a violation of
Article 47, if states diverge from the VCDR privileges by agreement or custom).
211. See, e.g., Michel Camdessus & James D. Wolfensohn, Op-Ed., Abused Foreign
Workers, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1999, at A24 (expressing their concern, as executives
of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, respectively, that some of
their staff have been exploiting their domestic employees).
212. See Mark S. Zaid, Diplomatic Immunity: To Have or Not to Have, That is the
Question, 4 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 623, 631 (1998) (proposing that in addition to
implementing bilateral treaties, a procedure should be established between countries
where they agree that the diplomat will stand trial in the receiving state if there is
sufficient evidence to show that the diplomat violated the law).
213. See, e.g., Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
Act 1982, ch. 11, s. 7 (U.K.); Observance of Due Process of Law Act, 1368, 42 Edw. 3,
c. 3 (Eng.).
214. See, e.g., Maid to Order: Ending Abuses Against Migrant Domestic Workers in
Singapore, 17 HUM. RTS. WATCH 10, 102 (2005), available at http://hrw.org/
reports/2005/singapore1205/ singapore1205wcover.pdf [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, Maid to Order] (discussing how the Philippines’ government through the
Philippines Overseas Employment Administration and its diplomatic presence in
Singapore developed more support for domestic workers in Singapore by issuing
employment contracts and providing assistance to workers); see Jones, Jr., supra note
196, at 265-66 (suggesting, as the State Department Office of the Legal Adviser, that
foreign missions are seemingly more inclined to waive immunity in U.S. courts
because of their confidence in the fairness of the U.S. judicial system);.
215. See, e.g., ILO, supra note 164, at 141-42 (providing an example of a bilateral
agreement between the Philippines and Kuwait, with a provision that explicitly states
that if parties cannot settle amicably, they have a right to resort to adjudication).
216. See Jones, Jr., supra note 196, at 266 (suggesting that the increased use and
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cooperating and negotiating with other countries, reciprocity concerns will
be minimal because the U.S. government will not unilaterally apply an
alternative interpretation of the VCDR commercial activity exception.217
B. The State Department Should Strengthen Contract Provisions and
Requirements to Ensure that the Responsibilities of Diplomats are Clearly
Understood Between Diplomats, Sending States, the United States, and
Domestic Workers
The State Department should mandate that the employment contracts,
which already require special temporary visas for domestic employees,
include explicit provisions to indicate where sending states waived criminal
and civil immunity privileges in the event that there are allegations made
by domestic workers against diplomats. To be sure, the employment
contract should require that the sending state co-sign the contract.218 By
doing so, the sending state recognizes that the diplomat, as a representative
of the sending state, obliges to follow U.S. laws and regulations in
employing their personal employees.219
Where diplomats and their sending states refuse to waive immunity
privileges, the State Department should deny or revoke the diplomats’
special visa privileges.220 Moreover, if diplomats have a record of abusing
previous employees or there have been complaints filed against them, the
more consistent, formalized system of requesting waivers of immunity from sending
states will not only ensure that individuals in the United States have stronger
protections, but on the basis of reciprocity, will encourage stronger bilateral ties that
will further diplomatic relations); see also Stephen L. Wright, Note, Diplomatic
Immunity: A Proposal for Amending the Vienna Convention to Deter Violent Criminal
Acts, 5 B.U. INT’L L.J. 177, 177-78 (1987) (arguing that immunity privileges are
undermining diplomatic relations as a result of the tension between states in resolving
diplomats who violate the law and suggesting amendments to the VCDR to deter
violent criminal acts).
217. See Veronica L. Maginnis, Note, Limiting Diplomatic Immunity: Lessons
Learned from the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 989, 1022 (2003) (suggesting that if enough states enter
into agreements to apply an alternative interpretation of immunity, then the approach
would eventually become customary international law where all states would be bound
by the new interpretation).
218. See CIRCULAR DIPLOMATIC NOTE OF MAY 1996, supra note 109
(recommending that the mission review and maintain a copy of the employment
contract between its diplomat and the domestic personal employee because the State
Department will ultimately hold the sending government liable for misconduct of its
diplomats).
219. Cf. VCDR, supra note 8, art. 9 (stating that the receiving state can, at any time
and without a reason, declare a diplomat persona non grata, which implies that it does
not have to recognize the person as a member of the mission and the diplomat will
likely have to return to his/her home country).
220. See 9 F.A.M. § 41.21 n.6.2 (2001) (giving consular officers who review visa
applications the discretion to deny A-3 and G-5 visas where the application does not
include an employment contract or the employment contract does not provide
provisions, such as fair wages, that protect the employee).
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State Department should revoke their visa privileges and initiate
appropriate investigations.221 The State Department could also require
diplomats to post a security bond when they file for the special work visas
for domestic employees.222 Because employers would have to forfeit this
deposit if found liable for abusing their employees, the deposit would serve
as an added protection to prevent exploitation of workers.
C. The State Department Should Develop a Centralized Register System
to Track Complaints and Maintain Employment Contracts, and Implement
a System to Monitor Compliance of Employment Contracts
To accompany the more rigorous visa application process and
employment contract provisions, the State Department needs to develop a
centralized register system that maintains the employment contracts
between foreign government officials and domestic workers in the United
States on special temporary visas.223 By doing so, the U.S. government
will be able to implement a system that is able to account for the
complaints filed against employers and properly monitor whether
diplomatic employers are abusing their privileges.224
In conjunction with a centralized system of records, the State
Department must articulate a clear process through which to file
complaints, including what types of documents the complainant should
submit to demonstrate that a civil liability exists given the particular
challenges of documenting exploitation in these types of cases.225 Even if
the State Department did not investigate the complaint further, at a
minimum, there would be a record and documentation of the complaint
against the diplomat, which would be useful should that diplomat apply for

221. See CIRCULAR DIPLOMATIC NOTE OF JUNE 2000, supra note 34.
222. See, e.g., MINISTRY OF MANPOWER, EMPLOYERS’ GUIDELINES: TERMINATION OF

SERVICES, REPATRIATION AND SECURITY BOND, http://www.mom.gov.sg/pub
lish/momportal/en/communities/work_pass/foreign_domestic_workers/employers__gui
delines/Termination_of_Services__Repatriation_and_Security_Bond.html (requiring
employers in Singapore to post a S$5,000 (U.S. $2,950) bond when applying for visas
for foreign domestic employees to ensure that the employers follow employment
guidelines and repatriate their workers at the end of their employment relationship).
223. See The Special Rapporteur, supra note 30, ¶¶ 15, 85.
224. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Maid to Order, supra note 214, at 24 (arguing that
one of the strength’s of Singapore’s regulations governing foreign domestic workers is
that there is a centralized system: one division, the Ministry of Manpower, which
handles and manages the labor policy and complaints).
225. See 2 F.A.M. § 234.2 (1991) (setting forth that the complainant needs to notify
the State Department in writing with “satisfactory evidence” that the diplomat owes her
a debt of civil liability, that she has attempted to address matters independently with the
mission with no avail, and that immunity would prevent her from adjudicating the
issue). The State Department does not provide guidelines or examples of the type of
evidence needed to show a civil liability. Id.
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more special work visas or if other employees file similar complaints.226
Proper inspection procedures to monitor compliance with the provisions
of employment contracts are also necessary to ensure that diplomats are not
abusing their workers and to deter diplomats from doing so.227 For
example, the State Department could hold mandatory briefings for foreign
personnel and their domestic employees where both parties would be given
resources to better understand their rights and obligations.228 These
periodic trainings, which would be a condition imposed on diplomats to
receive and maintain the special visas for domestic employees, would also
offer an opportunity for attorneys and advocates to provide information to
the workers should they want to seek legal assistance.229 Recognizing that
there are logistical challenges of providing the resources for holding
briefings for the thousands of domestic workers in the United States, at a
minimum, however, it would provide some oversight and transparency to
the hidden nature of the employment of domestic workers without
imposing heavy burdens on the parties.
D. The State Department’s Motor Insurance Scheme Demonstrates the
Feasibility of These Mechanisms
These proposals are within the authority of the State Department to
implement, and in many ways, similar mechanisms already exist.230 For
example, Congress developed a motor licensing and insurance scheme
when it enacted the Diplomatic Relations Act to address public concerns
regarding traffic offenses committed by diplomats.231 Even though the
226. Cf. Jones, Jr., supra note 196, at 263 (explaining how the centralized database
to maintain motor insurance and traffic citations of diplomats helps the State
Department monitor whether it should issue or revoke licenses depending on whether
the diplomat possesses adequate insurance, has a citation for driving under the
influence of alcohol, or has too many traffic citations based on a point system).
227. See Written Statement on Ending the Exploitation of Migrant Domestic
Workers Employed by UN Diplomats and Staff, Global Rights and American Civil
Liberties Union, submitted to the Commission on Human Rights, 61st Session (Apr. 1,
2005) ¶¶ 5-6, available at http://www.aclu. org/Files PDFs/written%20statement
%20on%20migrant%20workers%20un.pdf (suggesting that abuse is still pervasive
even with model contracts; and recommending the need for “watchdog mechanisms,”
such as government enforcement of the contract obligations, to oversee and monitor
employment conditions).
228. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Maid to Order, supra note 214, at 30 (discussing
Singapore’s mandatory orientation training for new employers that hire migrant
domestic employees to learn, among other things, that employers cannot deduct from
their workers’ salaries as a form of punishment).
229. See id. (explaining another compulsory safety awareness training mandated by
the Singapore government so migrant domestic workers have an opportunity to learn
about workplace practices, such as operating electrical compliances safely, and what
type of work is lawful under their work permit).
230. See Jones, Jr., supra note 196, at 263.
231. See Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. § 254e (1978) (requiring
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issue of traffic accidents was discussed during the VCDR negotiation
history and the drafters ultimately decided not to explicitly include an
exception to immunity in this regard, the State Department recognized the
growing problem of diplomats committing traffic violations and the more
serious cases where diplomatic immunity deprived injured third parties of
their remedies.232 Thus, Congress passed legislation mandating diplomats
to acquire motor insurance, enacting a special statute that would allow
aggrieved parties to sue the insurance company directly rather than the
diplomat, and requiring the State Department to develop a system to
document and track diplomats who violated traffic laws.233 Similarly, even
though the VCDR did not explicitly include that domestic workers could
bring suit against diplomats—though arguably, this would fall within the
commercial activity exception—implementing a more concrete system to
address the pervasive diplomatic abuse and exploitation of domestic
workers would be consistent with the laws and mandate in which the motor
insurance and licensing scheme arose.234
Additionally, just as the purpose of requiring diplomats to obtain motor
insurance is to protect the rights and remedies of those injured in motor
accidents, employment contracts between diplomats and domestic workers
are meant to ensure that the employees are aware of their rights and
remedies, and that the employers are aware of their duties and
obligations.235 The Office of the Legal Adviser of the State Department
considered licenses to operate motor vehicles as a privilege and not a
right.236 Consequently, if the State Department were to revoke diplomats’
diplomats to acquire insurance in the event that diplomats are involved in traffic
accidents to ensure that aggrieved parties have an opportunity to adjudicate their
claims); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1364 (adding, as a supplement to the Diplomatic
Relations Act, that insurance companies cannot invoke immunity as a defense); Foreign
Missions Act, 22 U.S.C. § 4304a (1982) (imposing a surcharge or fee based on the
amount of damages incurred by the victim even where there is no-court rendered
judgment when diplomats are: (1) at fault for injuring or causing the death of another;
(2) as a result of motor accident; and (3) have failed to acquire liability insurance).
232. See S. REP. NO. 95-958, at 3 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1935,
1937.
233. See S. REP. NO. 95-1108, at 3 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1941,
1943 (explaining how mandatory liability insurance for diplomats and a direct action
statute to enable victims from traffic accidents to sue insurance companies directly
would not only provide a recourse for injured parties who would otherwise be denied of
a remedy because of diplomatic immunity, but it would also prevent the State
Department from invading the personal inviolability of a diplomat).
234. See S. REP. NO. 95-958, at 7 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1935,
1940.
235. Compare S. REP. NO. 95-1108, at 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1935, 1940-41 (explaining that the purpose of insurance is to ensure remedies for the
aggrieved parties), with CIRCULAR DIPLOMATIC NOTE OF JUNE 2000, supra note 34, at
1-2 (requiring that diplomats offer a written employment contract to domestic
employees to ensure that both parties understand their rights, duties, and obligations).
236. See Jones, Jr., supra note 196, at 263 (arguing that the State Department Office
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licenses in the event that they abused that privilege, it would not violate the
VCDR.237 Moreover, because U.S. government officials are subject to the
same State Department policies, reciprocity concerns are minimal.238
Similar to the privilege to operate a motor vehicle, the special visas that the
State Department provides diplomats to hire and bring domestic employees
to the United States also are considered a privilege.239 As such, revoking
the visa privileges of diplomats to bring domestic employees into the
United States if they violate U.S. laws would not interfere with the VCDR.
CONCLUSION
Under the current laws governing diplomatic immunity, the State
Department plays a critical role in regulating diplomats’ abuse of their
immunity privileges.240
To ensure that diplomatic employers are
complying with U.S. laws and not exploiting their domestic workers, the
State Department needs to exercise its authority to intervene in cases where
claimants will be locked out of courts as a result of diplomatic immunity.241
Despite the State Department’s claim that adjudication of claims will
interfere with diplomatic relations, U.S. laws and regulations demonstrate
that recognition of the rights and remedies of domestic workers will not
impact U.S. interests, sovereign equality, international stability, and cordial
diplomatic relations.242 Not only does the statutory construction and the
legislative history reveal that employment of domestic workers constitutes
a commercial activity that denies diplomats immunity from civil
jurisdiction, case law governing employment relationships between
of the Legal Adviser’s rules to monitor traffic offenses do not interfere with the VCDR
because the State Department has authority to regulate privileges, such as operation of
motor vehicles).
237. See id. at 263-64 (explaining that because licenses are a privilege, and not a
right, the State Department has the authority to revoke them without interference with
the VCDR, whereas prosecuting a diplomat for drunk driving without the sending state
first waiving immunity would violate the VCDR).
238. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of Foreign Missions, Diplomatic Motor Vehicle
Reciprocity Program, http://www.state.gov/ofm/resources/imp/23417.htm (last visited
Feb. 2, 2007) (describing that the Office of Foreign Missions assesses practices in other
countries by conducting surveys and examining the issues that arise among missions to
develop a country specific reciprocal policy to ensure equal treatment).
239. See CIRCULAR DIPLOMATIC NOTE OF MAY 1996, supra note 109 (providing that
the State Department has the right to deny an A-3 visa application if employer violates
the terms of employment).
240. See 2 F.A.M. § 233.2 (1991); see also Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra
note 30, ¶ 56 (emphasizing the role of states to ensure domestic workers protection
from abusive employers).
241. See Testimony of Keyes, supra note 14, at 5-6 (asserting to the Inter-American
Commission for Human Rights the importance of lifting the “legal roadblock” of
diplomatic immunity so domestic workers who suffer from human rights violations
committed by diplomatic employers can effectively obtain redress).
242. See, e.g., Park v. Shin, 313 F.3d 1138, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002).
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domestic workers and consular officials, foreign state agents, and private
individuals illustrates the importance of ensuring that domestic workers are
not shut out of courts merely because their employers are diplomats.243
Therefore, where diplomatic employers have allegedly violated U.S. laws
in their treatment of domestic workers, either courts or the State
Department should apply an alternative, broader interpretation of the
VCDR immunity exceptions to include the employment of domestic
workers, or the State Department should follow its own FAM regulations
and intervene by requesting a waiver of immunity from the sending state to
ensure that domestic workers have an opportunity to be heard in court. By
doing so, the State Department will no longer provide diplomats a haven to
continue mistreating workers ensuring that diplomats no longer hide behind
a shield of immunity.

243. See Mooketsi, supra note 124 (referencing Judge Digngake’s ruling that
diplomatic immunity under the VCDR does not extend to labor disputes because
employment is a private act).
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